The appellant was charged with obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty. He was convicted and sought leave to appeal in Hedley v Spivey,  WASC 325, on the grounds that the magistrate wasn’t in a Chapter III court, that he failed to swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown, and that he refused to state where in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution 1901 his authority to sit in the court comes from without having sworn an oath of allegiance to the Crown.
“The magistrate was quite correct in his appreciation of the law and the appellant would have done well to have followed his judgment instead of lodging these grounds of appeal. Although having heard the appellant, it is clear that he holds these misguided views very strongly. The fact that a person is unrepresented is a misfortune, not a privilege. However, the law does not change because a self-represented litigant has limited understanding or knowledge. The Court of Appeal has abundantly made clear in Shaw v Jim McGinty  WASCA 231; Glew v Shire of Greenough  WASCA 260; Glew Technologies v Department of Planning and Infrastructure  WASCA 289, and as single Judges have made clear in Krysiak v Hodgson  WASC 16 and Williamson v Hodgson  WASC 95, the central tenet of the appellant’s proposition is fallacious.”
The appellant appealed this decision in Hedley v Spivey,  WASCA 116, on basically the same grounds, as well as that “…the State Government of Western Australia is a company with the ABN 66 012 878 629, and that both the State Government of Western Australia and the Attorney Generals Office of Western Australia are subsidiary companies of the Commonwealth of Australia which is registered as a corporation with the US Securities and Exchanges Commission number 00 00 80 51 57.”
After clarifying that “I’m not Mr Hedley. Please do not call me by that name. All right? That is a legal fiction and I’m not a corporation.” the applicant refused to proceed with the hearing until the court proved they are “…a jura court and not a corporation masquerading as judges.” The court decided to summarily dismiss the appeal.
“To provide a substantive response to the appellant’s demand that the members of the coram answer his questions would be to give credence to the long discredited legal contentions on which he relies. It was apparent from the appellant’s submissions in the Magistrates Court, the single judge appeal and in this court that he does not accept the authority of State courts or their decisions that the contentions on which he relies are frivolous and vexatious. The appellant’s appeal and his conduct at the leave hearing constitute an abuse of process of the court. Summary dismissal was the only appropriate course. A formal record of the orders made at the hearing was signed by the registrar on 1 May 2012. The Certificate of Conclusion of the Criminal Appeal is signed and dated 7 May 2012. As the appeal is finalised, no action will be taken on any of the documents which the appellant has subsequently lodged with the court. If the appellant wishes to challenge the orders made on 1 May 2012, he will need to seek relief in the High Court.”