The Trustee of the Property of Currey (A Bankrupt) v Currey [2017] FCCA 2692

Kevyn Grantley Currey and Glenys Anne Currey were sued by the Commonwealth Bank in regard to loans made to the Curreys’ family company KGC Rural Pty Ltd, totaling $1,652,334.77. Both parties applied for summary judgment against the other, but the bank prevailed and was given judgment. The Curreys appealed, but did not prosecute their appeal in a timely way, and the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. The bank sought to enforce the judgment, and in response, the Currey’s sought to restrain enforcement by injunction but their application failed as by this time the bank had secured the issue of a warrant for possession of a property at Wongawallan.  They subsequently applied to have the enforcement warrant set aside, or alternatively, for a stay of enforcement of the warrant for possession, and that application also failed. The bank then filed a cross application seeking an order prohibiting the Currey’s from filing any other application in the then pending Supreme Court proceeding or from starting similar proceedings in any other Court without leave of the Court. The bank prevailed, and the Currey’s applications were dismissed.

Receivers were appointed over the Wongawallan property, and they filed an application against the Currey’s to determine the ownership of cattle located at the property, which at the hearing the Curreys unsuccessfully made an application for leave to file an application to “set aside” the summary judgment in the Supreme Court proceeding and the prohibition orders that had been made against them. The bank was also awarded summary judgment against the Currey’s (as guarantors) in the amount of $59,616.62. The bank issued a bankruptcy notice against the Currey’s based upon the judgment of the Supreme Court and of the Magistrates Court. The bankruptcy notice was served upon the Currey’s, to which they did not comply. 

The bank filed a creditor’s petition, for the judgment debt in the Supreme Court proceedings of $1,652,334.77 together with interest and the judgment debt in the Magistrates Court proceedings of $59,616.62 with interest. The petition included credit for some monies that had been recovered. Again, the bank prevailed, and and a sequestration order against the estates of the Currey’s and an order for costs were made.

In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Currey [2016] FCCA 124 the Currey’s sought a review to have the judgment debt the subject of the petition set aside, citing clause 25.1 of the Code of banking Practice. Further, it was claimed that the Bank accepted promissory notes in regard to the debt (at 25):

“…they dispute the money remained outstanding because the defendants provided to the bank what the defendants claim were promissory notes such that they constituted an offer for an agreement to repay the money in the future. It is contended the proffering of those promissory notes in circumstances where the plaintiff did not return them constituted an acceptance of that offer such that the monies are no longer are owing.”

Jarrett J found that the contentions raised did not establish that there was sufficient cause for a sequestration order not to be made, and that the sequestration order was appropriate. 

The trustee in bankruptcy applied for orders that the Currey’s to deliver up to him vacant possession of the Wongawallan property, and another obliging them to file their statements of affairs and furnish a copy to him as required. In The Trustee of the Property of Currey (A Bankrupt) v Currey [2017] FCCA 2692 the Currey’s filed two affidavits in identical terms, stating they “want the contract re-done using Common Law, in the Private” with “CORRECTPARSE-SYNTAX-GRAMMAR” among various allegations of false & misleading conduct, misrepresentations, misinformation, misdirection, and perjury on behalf of the Bank. 

With the assistance of David Wynn Miller, the Currey’s filed several more documents, including: 


Jarratt J observed (at 17-19):

“When the matter came on for hearing before me, the respondents represented themselves. At the commencement of the hearing, Mrs Currey wished to hand me a document which she described as an “Amicus Curiae”. Curious as to the nature of the document, I invited Mrs Currey to provide me with a copy of the document. Although she was anxious to ensure that I had the original which was affixed with some stamps, in the end I declined to take the original but received the copy. That document is annexed to these reasons and marked “A”. To reproduce it otherwise in these reasons would do it no justice. Notwithstanding the assistance that the respondents argue I should get from this document, unfortunately I do not understand any of it. Neither Mrs Currey nor Mr Currey could explain it to me in any comprehensible way, although each seemed to have complete confidence that they were explaining their case to me perfectly clearly.”


Jarrett J noted (at 20-22) that similar contentions of “syntax fraud” were raised by David Wynn Miller in Wollongong City Council v Falamaki [2009] FMCA 1204 and  Wollongong City Council v Falamaki [2010] NSWLEC 66 where Craig J recorded that he did not find the submissions helpful in addressing Dr Falamaki’s claim. Jarrett J also concluded (at 23):

“Similarly, I do not find the submissions made by Mr and Mrs Currey based upon what they described as “CORRECT-SENTENCE-STRUCTURE-COMMUNICATION-PARSE-SYNTAX-GRAMMAR” helpful. Indeed, I did not find them comprehensible.”

See also Rambaldi & anor v Rice Bar Restaurant & anor [2018] VSC 218, Maksacheff v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2017] NSWCA 126 and Wollongong City Council v Falamaki [2009] FMCA 1204. David Wynn Miller‘s “syntax grammar fraud” is also raised in relation to the “glossa” or “dog latin” premise concocted by Romley Stewart Stover and Rohan Lorian Hilder. This is covered in The Romley Stewart Deception, by Justinian.

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