The applicant contended that the Court of Appeal was not a lawfully established court and raised a complaint that the only form of legal tender was gold or silver coin, in defence of a cannabis charge. Of note in this case is the references to Alan Skyring’s influence on the applicant.
(from 16) “When I questioned the applicant about one of her submissions, she stated she was “just following directions given to me”. She later said that “Alan” had helped her with her material. Mr Alan Skyring was in the back of the Court. She explained that she suffered from anxiety and was confused about dates and asked the Court to consult “Alan” if the Court wanted information which she could not supply. Mr Skyring at this point moved forward to address the Court but was quickly told that his assistance was unnecessary. He resumed his seat in the rear of the Court. It is clear from the transcript of these matters in the Magistrates and District Court and from the applicant’s submissions in this Court that Mr Skyring has been present at some (if not all) of these hearings and has aided and encouraged the applicant in pursuing her appeals in which arguments were raised that he had previously raised unsuccessfully in this Court where Mr Skyring has been a frequent litigator: see for example Skyring v Commonwealth Commissioner of Taxation  QCA 119; Skyring v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group QCA 118;  QCA 143; Re Skyring  QCA 460; and Skyring v Lohe QCA 451. Unfortunately it seems likely that his “assistance” to the applicant has added to her anxious and confused state and her financial difficulties about which she addressed this Court. Mr Skyring was declared a vexatious litigant under the Vexatious Litigants Act 1981 (Qld) (repealed) on 5 April 1995. Under s 16 Vexatious Proceedings Act 2005 (Qld), orders under the repealed Act are taken to be orders under the current Act. It is of concern to the administration of justice that a vexatious litigant like Mr Skyring may be encouraging vulnerable people like the applicant to undertake unwinnable litigation and to pursue appeals which impose unnecessary costs on the community. It amounts to an abuse of process. It may be appropriate in like instances in the future, for the Attorney-General to consider whether an application should be made to permanently stay proceedings if it is thought that Mr Skyring may be acting in concert with another person in the institution of proceedings in Queensland Courts: see s 10 Vexatious Proceedings Act and Cameron v Peter D Beattie (in his capacity as Premier) & Ors QCA 392 but cf Clampett v Kerslake (Electoral Commissioner of Queensland  QCA 104.). As Judge Shanahan identified, the applicant’s contentions have all been aired in this and other courts before and have rightly been dismissed: see for example Sharples v Arnison  2 Qd R 444; QCA 518;Skyring v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd QCA 376; Re Skyring’s Application (No 2)(1985) 59 ALJR 561; and Re Cusack (1985) 60 ALJR 302. In Re Skyring(1994) 68 ALJR 618, Dawson J said: “It would, in my view, be an abuse of process to allow the applicant to relitigate a matter which has already been decided adversely to him” (at 619). See also Professor Anne Twomey’s discussion of these arguments in “The Australia Acts 1986 Australia’s Statutes of Independence” (pp 367-368).
In Kosteska v Commissioner of Police  QCA 219 Lille Kosteska was appealing an unlicenced driving matter.
“The applicant advanced many arguments which, when intelligible, were singularly misguided. The submissions remonstrate against the inadequacies of the Australian legal system, query whether the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 had a commencement date, as none is explicitly stated within the Act itself, appear at times to be directed to proceedings other than those under consideration, concern themselves with actions within the High Court Registry which appear to relate to the refusal of the registry to accept documents which the applicant attempted to file, allege the existence of political intrigues and conspiracies and advert to the vicissitudes of litigation in the Supreme Court of Queensland, the Federal Court of Australia and the High Court affecting a “friend” of the applicant. The applicant sought to rely on an affidavit sworn by Alan George Skyring on 23 July 2012. Mr Skyring swore that he was the “friend” referred to in the applicant’s submissions. His affidavit commences with a brief discussion of his observations of proceedings in the District Court on the day that the applicant’s appeal was struck out. There was no issue on this application about those matters. Mr Skyring had warmed to the task of attempting to shed doubt on the validity of various statutes, both State and Federal, and of identifying a rather vague “state of affairs” affecting the legal system “to its very core”. If there is anything relevant or admissible in the affidavit, I was unable to detect it. I would refuse leave to read and file the affidavit.”
Appeal to the High Court sought, and dismissed in Lille Kosteska v Commissioner Of Police  HCASL 160
“It was also argued that her Honour was “severely constrained” in respect of the orders she could make by the “British Coat of Arms” which appeared above the bench. Apparently, the presence of this representation (of what is actually the Royal Coat of Arms) required that the law which was to be upheld in all proceedings was the common law of England “in all of its might and majesty”. But, says Ms Kosteska, that requirement was ignored. There are occasions (thankfully very rare) when a submission is made that is so misguided, so erroneous and so lacking in any understanding of the basics of Australian law that one is faced with a truly sublime absurdity. This is such an argument. The presence of a coat of arms in a courtroom is merely a symbol of authority. It provides no power. It creates no duty.
This is not the first case in which Ms Kosteska’s argument has been advanced. It, and others like it, have wasted the time of the courts and opposing litigants, together with taxpayers’ money for some time. (This is not a peculiarly Australian problem. Similar fruitless cases have burdened the Canadian courts – so much so that Associate Chief Justice Rooke has examined in detail the characteristics, indicia and concepts of what he describes as Organised Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments.”
The applicant sought leave to the High Court to appeal Mullins J’s decision to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland asserting a denial of natural justice, and flaws in Australia’s entire legal system.
- https://jade.io/article/254187 https://freemandelusion.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/kosteska-v-phillips-kosteska-v-commissioner-of-police-2011-qca-266.pdf
- https://jade.io/article/272326 https://freemandelusion.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/kosteska-v-commissioner-of-police-2012-qca-219.pdf
- https://jade.io/article/287183 https://freemandelusion.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/lille-kosteska-v-commissioner-of-police-2012-hcasl-160-.pdf
- https://jade.io/article/294881 https://freemandelusion.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/kosteska-v-magistrate-manthey-anor-2013-qca-105.pdf
- https://jade.io/article/301189 https://freemandelusion.files.wordpress.com/2019/05/lille-kosteska-v-bevan-manthey-magistrate-and-anor-2013-hcasl-141.pdf