Harley Robert Williamson

Harley Williamson was charged for speeding and found guilty. In Williamson v Hodgson [2010] WASC 95, he had numerous grounds of appeal, starting with the premise that section 45 of the Criminal Code (WA) affords him some defence to the speeding charge, that the magistrate erred in law by refusing his request for a trial by jury, that the provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), are unlawful because they are inconsistent with the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, that the learned magistrate did not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the case, and that his Honour swore at him. Further, he claims to have seceded from the Commonwealth of Australia and that he is not subject to the Road Traffic Code, and that the UN Covenant has given him this right, that the Magistrates Court did not have the lawful authority to try him since the passing of the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA), and that the entity who issued him with the infringement notice had an Australian business number or ABN, and he was therefore being prosecuted by a corporation and not the police. The Court held that none of the grounds have a reasonable prospect of succeeding, and are devoid of any merit.

In Maxwell (also known as Harley Robert Williamson) v Bruse [2012] WASC 12 a dispute occurred over a bottle of liquor and Harley Williamson sold his former friend’s truck. He was subsequently found guilty of theft, and appealed the conviction, arguing with the Strawman premise that his change of name from Bailey to Maxwell to Williamson immunized him from court action,  and that he was sovereign as resident in the “Principality of Pentecost”.

Harley Williamson and Tangiwai Maxwell had a home loan and credit card agreement, which became the subject of an order in which they were required to deliver up vacant possession of the property and to pay $285,583.88 due under the home loan agreement, and $11,627.39 due under the credit card agreement, along with interest and costs. The appeal was commenced out of time, and Harley Williamson’s application for an extension of time was heard in Williamson v The Bendigo Adelaide Bank Ltd [2012] WASCA 208 where there were 86 grounds of appeal. The grounds included that the writs were served on their all capitals corporate entities, on their birth certificates, not themselves, and that the property had seceded from Australia as the “Principality of Pentecost”. The Coronation Oath 1688 and the International Convention on the Abolition of Slavery and Debt Servitude also rate a mention in the list of case law appearing in his submissions. The application was dismissed.

Harley Williamson and Tangiwai Maxwell then applied for orders seeking a stay on the writ until their application for special leave to appeal in the High Court was heard, on the same grounds as raised in the case. This application in Williamson v The Bendigo Adelaide Bank Ltd [No 2] [2012] WASCA 269 was likewise dismissed. 

The application for special leave to appeal in the High Court in The Bendigo Adelaide Bank Ltd [2013] HCASL 107 was also dismissed. 

In Williamson v Johnson [2016] WASC 232, Harley Williamson applied for leave to appeal a conviction that he obstructed, hindered or intimidated a public officer who was performing a function of his office as a registrar for the Federal Court in the previous matter. He had threatened he would arrest the registrar if the hearing proceeded, and then left the bar table and walked behind the judicial bench at which Registrar Jan was sitting, placed his hand on the Registrar’s shoulder and stated that he was under arrest. The proposed grounds of appeal sought to raise a constitutional issue, but it was found to be trivial, unarguable, frivolous and vexatious. Harley Williamson had no defence to the charge alleged against him, and the application was rejected.

“Each of the appellant’s proposed grounds of appeal rested on the assertion that Registrar Jan was purporting to exercise a power that he did not possess in hearing and determining the application for a sequestration order and accordingly, that he was committing a criminal offence for which he could be arrested under the CI Act.  That assertion was based on a mistaken view of the constitutional validity of the statutory scheme by which the Registrar exercised power to hear and determine the application by making a sequestration order.”