Wayne Kenneth Glew has an extensive OPCA and constitutional litigation history. In fact, the decisions made in Wayne’s cases are relied upon, whenever similar contentions are brought before courts today, and in many cases they have become precedent in the particular point of law. You just have to look at all the cases in which his first case Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260 has been cited in cases since 2006, using the contentions he still claims are valid. There are over 50 cases where the case has been referred to, to dispose of the contentions of his followers, and that is just one of his cases. This document lists all the subsequent cases in the higher courts which have referred to the decisions in his failed cases to reject the particular contentions.
Wayne Glew’s Litigation History
(1) Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260:
The Shire of Greenough filed a summons seeking one years arrears of rates, penalty interest and costs. The Local Court at Geraldton granted the councils orders. Wayne Glew filed in the Court of Appeal claiming various constitutional arguments. He contented that rates are unconstitutional as local government is not recognised in the Commonwealth Constitution, and their very existence shows the State government ignored the results of 1988 referendum where the people said no. Also, a State referendum was required to alter the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) to implement local government in Western Australia. Further, he claimed that the States are not lawfully permitted to raise these taxes, after the High Court ruled it is a Commonwealth responsibility, and as land ownership in fee simple alienates the property from the Crown, the government has no power to regulate activities or charge rates. He also contended that the oaths taken by judges is unlawful following the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA) removing references to the Crown, so the magistrates had no power to grant the councils orders.
Wheeler JA patiently explained the constitutional structure of a federation and the residual powers of the States, the effect of a referendum where the question is not carried, the concurrent powers of taxation, the effect of fee simple title, and that there is no prohibition on the change in terminology in reference to the Crown. Buss JA and Pullin JA agreed. The Court concluded (at 29):
“As his Honour Magistrate King recognised, the appellants’ submissions are based on a misunderstanding of the Commonwealth and State Constitutions and are entirely lacking in legal merit. The appeal must fail and Mr and Mrs Glew must pay their rates.”
(2) Not happy with this result, Wayne Glew sought special leave to apply to the High Court in Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough [2007] HCATrans 520. The Court agreed with the decision, and dismissed the application, noting:
“We agree, and the same expression applies to the prolix, offensive and vexatious documents filed in support of this special leave application.”
(3) After he was convicted of failing to transfer a vehicle registration, and was subsequently fined $100 ordered to pay costs of $66, Wayne Glew appealed to the Supreme Court but al four grounds were dismissed. At the Court of Appeal in Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure [2007] WASCA 289 he tried to reagitate the same matters raised previously, as well as accusing the Local Court magistrate and the judge of the Supreme Court of treason for assuming they could hear matters without the authority of The Crown, and holding a star chamber contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution. Pullin JA found that none of the grounds had any reasonable prospects of success, so leave to appeal was refused, and Miller JA and Beech JA agreed. (at 3):
“The magistrate noted at least two of those arguments have been put in slightly different guises before and have been considered by the Court of Appeal in Glew v The Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260. Re-agitating the same point; though slightly differently expressed is mischievous and vexatious.”
(4) Wayne Glew then objected to the taxation on the costs in [2006] WASCA 260, and at the hearing before the Registrar he challenged the right of the Registrar to be in the court. At the Court of Appeal in Glew v Shire of Greenough [No 2] [2008] WASCA 75 he also raised the question of Justice Beech’s authority to sit, which he described as “incomprehensible in any legal sense” and the contentions “misconceived and devoid of legal merit”, referring to Glew’s contentions that the Registrar refused to deal with a challenge to his jurisdiction, a revealed fraud on the Court, revealed indictable offences, and the constitutional issues raised. Beech J refused leave to appeal, noting (at 22):
“The contentions set out in the statement of issues largely seek to re-agitate arguments put to, and rejected by, the Court of Appeal in this matter. The contentions also include vexatious and unsubstantiated assertions of fraud and of the commission of indictable offences.”
(5) Wayne Glew then issued a writ of summons directed to the Governor of Western Australia, contending that as a result of an alleged failure by governmental entities to comply with the requirements of the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) and certain other provisions, various institutions are functioning unlawfully and have, in effect, created an illegal state and have fractured the Commonwealth. Wayne Glew alleged that the Australia Acts (Request) Act 1985 (WA) and the Australia Act 1986 (Cth), the Electoral Amendment and Repeal Act 2005 (WA) and the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA) did not conform with the prescribed manner and form provisions of section 73(2)(g) of the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) and are therefore invalid, seeking a declaration that they are void and of no effect, and also an injunction to prevent the next State election. Further, he submitted that the Governor, the Attorney‑General and the Parliament of Western Australia unlawfully and illegally removed the Crown and Monarch from all legislation within Western Australia, without the formal referendum consent required under s 73(2)(g) of the Constitution Act, which was a breach of allegiance being treason and misprision of treason.
At the hearing in Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASC 14, Hasluck J refused to hear a DVD containing submissions made by declared vexatious litigant Brian Shaw, regarding the validity of the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA) and certain related matters regarding the Australia Acts 1986. The application by the Governor of Western Australia to strike out the whole statement of claim was allowed, on the grounds that it discloses no reasonable cause of action, is frivolous and vexatious.
(6) Wayne Glew then appealed against the decision of Hasluck J to strike out his statement of claim and dismiss the action on the ground that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was scandalous, frivolous and vexatious in Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123. Blaxell J noted (at 17):
“There are 42 grounds of appeal. I do not consider any useful purpose would be served by attempting to canvass the grounds of appeal. Many of them are, as the respondent submitted, incomprehensible. Others assert incorrect or irrelevant legal propositions and a number of them are scandalous and offensive.”
At 20):
“The appellant’s written outline of submissions did not advance the matter. It consisted, without any explanation as to their relevance, of the reproduction of a number of provisions of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Crimes Act 1958, Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (Cth), and miscellaneous other legislation, extracts from Black’s Law Dictionary and, from The Bible, extracts from the books of Exodus and Zechariah, the second epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, the epistle of James and the gospel according to St Matthew.”
And at 22-23):
“I should also point out that the appellant’s challenge to the validity of the AARCLP Act follows similar, unsuccessful, challenges to it in Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260 and Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure [2007] WASCA 289. An application to the High Court for special leave to appeal against the former decision was dismissed: Glew v Shire of Grennough [2007] HCATrans 520 (6 September 2007). The appellant needs to understand that he cannot simply revisit in other guises issues that have been decided against him. The persistent re-agitation of these issues is a waste of the time and resources of the court and puts the other party to significant expense and inconvenience. It cannot continue.”
(7) This appeal in Glew v City of Greater Geraldton [2012] WASCA 94 arose out of two proceedings in the Magistrates Court in which summary judgment was entered for the respondent against Wayne Glew, who appealed to the District Court against the judgment in each proceeding, which were dismissed by Birmingham DCJ. The grounds in the Court of Appeal regurgitated all of his previous contentions, including that Birmingham DCJ was wrong in law and fact when he relied on the decision in Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260 when that decision was wrong in law and fact and contrary to the State and Federal constitutions and Imperial Acts, and failed to remove himself from the bench when it was explained to him that he was an employee of a corporation through a subsidiary company and not an officer of the Crown. Newnes JA and Murphy JA noted (at 5):
“A number of the grounds of appeal repeat, in substance if not precisely the same terms, grounds that have been advanced by the appellant, and rejected by this court, in previous cases. Grounds to the same effect as grounds 2 and 3 were rejected in Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260 [21] – [25]; a ground to the same effect as ground 5 was rejected in Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure [2007] WASCA 289 [12] and Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 [14] – [16]; and a ground to the same effect as ground 7 was rejected in Glew v Frank Jasper [17] as being frivolous and vexatious, as this ground is. It is unnecessary to cover the same ground again. Those grounds are without merit and must be struck out.
We would note, however, that in Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123, this court said: “The appellant needs to understand that he cannot simply revisit in other guises issues that have been decided against him. The persistent reagitation of these issues is a waste of the time and resources of the court and puts the other party to significant expense and inconvenience. It cannot continue.”
It is apparent that that admonishment has fallen on deaf ears.”
(8) Wayne Glew was burning off on his property, and had a visit from two Bush Fire Control Officers as they suspected there was a fire, and they had a duty to investigate under the Bush Fires Act 1954 (WA). Glew appeared, told them they were trespassing and used nasty language, forcing them back into their car. He pushed one officer at least twice to the back, and closed the car door against one of his legs. The officers withdrew, and he was subsequently arrested by police for one offence of assaulting a public officer, and one offence of obstructing an officer in the execution of his duty. At the Geraldton Magistrates Court he was convicted and fined $1,000 for the first offence, $400 for the second offence and ordered to pay costs.
On appeal in Glew v White [2012] WASC 100 he complained that he was tried without a jury, that he didn’t consent to the proceedings, that he didn’t consent to his plea, the courts were defective for assorted repeated constitutional reasons, that his “no trespassing’ sign trumped state authority as the land was owned in fee simple, and that the Bush Fires Act was invalid.
Hall J noted his repetitive contentions (at 24):
“If the appellant was seeking to raise an argument that he has raised in other cases that the Magistrates Court was not lawfully constituted, then I would note that such an argument has been dismissed in Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260; Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure [2007] WASCA 289, and also in Krysiak v Hodgson [2009] WASC 16 and Krysiak v Hodgson [2009] WASCA 114. If the appellant was seeking to raise another argument that he has previously raised, namely that the charges were defective because the City of Greater Geraldton was unconstitutional, then I would note that a similar argument has also been dismissed in Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260.”
None of the proposed 12 grounds of appeal were found to be reasonably arguable, far less did any of them have any rational prospect of succeeding, and therefore leave was refused and the appeal was dismissed.
(9) Of course, Wayne Glew appealed against the judgment of Hall J refusing him leave to appeal against the convictions in Glew v White [2012] WASCA 138, where Pullin JA, Buss JA and Mazza JA were less than complimentary (at 11-13):
“This appeal is an abuse of process. The appellant is well aware that his idiosyncratic contentions have been repeatedly rejected in other cases. The appellant has invoked the court’s process and procedures for an illegitimate or collateral purpose, namely, as a platform for advancing his nonsensical theories. He appeared at the hearing with the support of a large retinue who appear to share or sympathise with his views. The appellant is not interested in securing justice according to law (either in relation to the convictions in question or otherwise) in accordance with the system of justice administered by the courts of this State. At the hearing on 5 July 2012 he advanced arguments in language which was often disparaging and derisory of this court and the functions it performs. The grounds of appeal consist of a pronouncement of the appellant’s eccentric theories about the judicial power of the Commonwealth, the Constitution, the right to trial by jury and the status of courts in this State. None of the grounds have any reasonable prospect of succeeding. … This appellant is wasting the time of the courts by repeatedly advancing his theories or variations of them, even though they have been dealt with and disposed of in other cases: See for example Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260; Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure [2007] WASCA 289; Glew v The Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123; Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87; Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew [No 2] [2010] WASC 24 and Glew v City of Greater Geraldton [2012] WASCA 94.”
The court directed the registrar to refer these reasons for decision, and those of Hall J, as well as all the material filed by Wayne Glew, transcripts of hearings and a list of other similar decisions involving him to the Attorney General with a request that the Attorney General consider making an application under s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA).
(10) Glew is apparently an inventor, and had “invented systems for the supply of fuel in a vaporised form into the combustion chamber of an internal combustion engine.” Frank Jasper and his company invested in the technology in exchange for a share of the profits, buying a license from Wayne Glew for $1 million to sell the invention within the US.
Following a breakdown in relations between the parties, in 2007 Frank Jasper sued Wayne Glew in a Supreme Court action. A further application was made by Frank Jasper that the parties give discovery in those proceedings, which was heard by Chief Justice Martin. Before the order was made, Wayne Glew made an oral application that the Chief Justice disqualify himself and submitted that the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) were “contrary to the Constitution”.
He filed an appeal notice for Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2008] WASCA 186 against the dismissal of the oral application that the Chief Justice disqualify himself and perhaps also against the order for discovery. There were 12 grounds of appeal. Frank Jasper’s solicitors sent an email to Wayne Glew stating that the appeal stood no prospect of success and that maintaining the appeal invited an order for costs on an indemnity basis, so he telephoned the solicitor and advised him that he was withdrawing the appeal, and later provided with a signed discontinuance notice. In dismissing an application for indemnity costs and making a special costs order, Pullin JA, with whom Newnes JA agreed, concluded (at 18-19):
“There is nothing in the grounds of appeal to suggest that they had any merit. The last ground suggests that the appellant still wished to run an argument dismissed in other cases; see Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260 and Shaw v McGinty [2006] WASCA 231. I also do infer that the appellant filed the notice of appeal thinking or hoping that it would result in an automatic stay of the order for discovery. In those circumstances, it could be concluded that the conduct of the appellant in instituting the appeal and conducting the appeal could be characterised as unreasonable, if not improper, and that the grounds of appeal were doomed to fail.”
(11) Frank Jasper issued a chambers summons for further and better and specific discovery. The parties had been unable to agree as to the appropriate costs orders, with each party seeking to be awarded its costs of the application. Martin CJ directed that the parties exchange written submissions on the topic, which he would resolve on the papers, and gave his reasons in Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew [2009] WASC 13.
(12) The hearing came before Martin CJ in Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew [No 2] [2010] WASC 24. The majority of the trial addressed two issues. First, when Wayne Glew spoke was it for Glew Technologies Pty Ltd, or both Glew Technologies Pty Ltd and himself. The court, rather unsurprisingly, says they were one and the same. The second issue is whether the invention was misrepresented. Frank Jasper Pty Ltd asserted that Wayne Glew had made representations with respect to fuel efficiency and reduced emissions which were misleading and deceptive, and due to reliance on these representations, it made various payments to facilitate further development between 2002 and 2007, including the 2003 Licence Agreement, to which it paid $1,000,000, and sought orders for the repayment of various specific payments, in addition to general damages.
Martin CJ concludes the Glew Technologies Pty Ltd is essentially irrelevant, and that Wayne Glew systematically misrepresented his invention, and interest in his invention, over and over and over… also lying about other sales and licenses in the works, such as that Toyota had offered $100 million for a license, and Mercedes wanted the technology for aircraft engines. His Honour made findings of fact in relation to aspects of misleading and deceptive conduct, and invited submissions from the parties as to the directions that should be made to enable a further trial of the matters remaining in issue.
(13) Wayne Glew appealed against the decision of Martin CJ in which His Honour found that he had engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in connection with the inventions, and also His Honour’s dismissing of a counterclaim by Wayne Glew seeking a declaration that the licence agreement relating to the inventions had been lawfully terminated. In Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87 he sought orders that the decision Martin J handed down be overturned and the case proceed to trial by jury in a civil matter, and all criminal issues be sent to trial by jury in criminal jurisdiction, that all questions of fact be identified and reserved for a judge and jury of 12 persons, that all costs orders be set aside until all the indictable and civil matters have been dealt with by a jury, and liberty to apply. The grounds were:
- 1. Wayne Stuart Martin sat in criminal contempt of the High Court of Australia when he failed to meet the requirements of chapter III of the Australian constitution.
- 2. Wayne Stuart Martin represented himself as a justice of the supreme court of Western Australia when he was an employee of the corporation ‘The Department of the Attorney General’. ABN: 70598 519443.
- 3. Wayne Stuart Martin sat in the supreme court of Western Australia knowing that the supreme court of Western Australia did not meet the constitutional requirements of chapter III of the Australian constitution.
- 4. Wayne Stuart Martin while acting as the chief Justice of the supreme court of Western Australia refused to allow a trial by jury contrary by [sic] section 80 of the Federal constitution and the act of Habius Corpus 1640. 1 Charles chapter 10.
- 5. Wayne Stuart Martin refused to allow Wayne Kenneth Glew the right to represent his company ‘Glew Technologies’ and then forced ‘Glew Technologies’ and Wayne Kenneth Glew the Director of ‘Glew Technologies PTY LTD’ to stand trial without representation. And therefore committed a crime against humanity being enslavement contrary to sections 268, 10, 11 and 12 of the crimes act 1914 Federal.
- 6. Wayne Stuart Martin handed down the decision in the above case on the 15th of February 2010 and at the time of handing down the decision ignored key parts of the evidence presented in court and acted in fraud and total bias to Wayne Kenneth Glew and ‘Glew Technologies PTY LTD’.
- 7. Wayne Stuart Martin had revealed to him on the 9th of September 2009 two separate indictable offences, those being conspiracy to pervert the course of justice contrary to section 42 of the Crimes Act 1914 Federal and an attempt to pervert the course of justice contrary to section 43 of the Crimes Act 1914 Federal. Wayne Stuart Martin refused to deal with the issues revealed to him therefore making him party to the offences committed.
- 8. Wayne Stuart Martin refused to acknowledge the constitutional issues raised in the court on the 7th – 10th September 2009 and refused to abide by them.”
Newnes JA and Murphy JA briefly responded to each of these issues (at 14-28). They amounted to a mixture of spurious arguments on judicial oaths, constitutional structure, and allegations of fraud. The Court found that none of the grounds of appeal had any reasonable prospect of success, and dismissed the appeal, again reminded him (at 15) that several of his contentions were dismissed in his previous cases:
“A similar contention by Mr Glew has twice been rejected by this court. In Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260, Mr Glew relied on other legislation which altered references to the Crown or to her Majesty to the Governor or the State, to argue that as a result neither the Local Court nor the District Court had any lawful authority. Wheeler JA (with whom Pullin and Buss JJA agreed) delivered detailed reasons in which her Honour explained that Mr Glew’s argument had no arguable foundation in law ([16] ‑ [20]). An application by Mr Glew for special leave to appeal to the High Court was dismissed: Glew v Shire of Greenough [2007] HCATrans 520 (6 September 2007). Undaunted, Mr Glew subsequently relied upon the same ground in Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure, where he contended that the ‘changing of the name of the Crown’ in certain State legislation meant that both the Magistrates Court and the Supreme Court lacked the authority of the Crown and therefore were invalidly constituted because they failed to meet the requirements of ch III. The argument fared no better on that occasion than it had the first time.”
(14) Back to the trial court in Frank Jasper Pty Ltd v Glew [No 3] [2012] WASC 24. Shortly prior to the hearing, Wayne Glew filed written submissions which dealt only with the question of Martin CJ’s authority to determine the proceedings, and which did not deal at all with any of the substantive issues in the case. When the matter came on for hearing, he again challenged His Honour’s authority to determine the claims against him by reference to those written submissions, which Martin CJ found to be incomprehensible, and failing to identify any coherent basis upon which it was asserted that his appointment as a judge of the court was invalid. He invited Wayne Glew to refer him to any provision of the Australian Constitution which could support the proposition that his appointment was invalid, and he was unable to identify any such provision, and therefore he considered his appointment to be valid, and that he had authority to determine the case, and would proceed to exercise that authority. At that point Wayne Glew indicated that he proposed to withdraw, and was advised clearly and unequivocally that if he did, they were likely to continue in his absence, and that judgment may be entered against him.
Nevertheless, he proceeded to withdraw, and took no further part in the hearing, forfeiting the ability to cross-examine the expert witnesses. The court received a letter from Wayne Glew, reiterating his assertion to the effect that the court lacked authority for reasons which the Court found unintelligible, and attached a document described as an “affidavit of reservation of rights” which was equally unintelligible. It was inferred from that correspondence that he maintained his position that he no longer wished to actively participate in the proceedings.
Mr David Worth, a mechanical engineer with expertise in the design and development of engines, provided an expert report setting out in detail the process of reasoning which caused him to conclude that the system offered no benefit over existing fuel systems and were not viable because of their inability to satisfy emission requirements in both Australia and the United States. Ms Dawna Wright, a chartered accountant practising in the area of forensic investigation and reporting, provided a written report setting out the process of reasoning which led her to conclude that the system always had been of no value. The court accepted this evidence, holding that the assessed value of the system was absolutely nothing.
Martin CJ was satisfied that Frank Jasper incurred expenditure in the total amount of $1,541,982.53, and that he had derived no value as a consequence of those payments, and had therefore suffered loss and damage in that amount, leading to the conclusion that judgment should be entered for that amount plus interest totaling $521,527.45 giving a total sum of $2,063,509.98.
Accordingly, judgment was entered in that amount against Wayne Glew, and Martin CJ invited submissions from the parties in respect of costs.
(15) Back to the Court of Appeal in Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 93, where Wayne Glew sought leave to appeal against the decision of Martin CJ awarding damages in the total amount of $2,063,509.98. The grounds of appeal were:
- 1. Justice Martin had a conflict of interest in that he had previously been employed by the solicitors for the plaintiff before being appointed a justice of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and should have disqualified himself as requested.
- 2. Justice Martin refused leave to represent Glew Technologies Pty Ltd in the proceedings which meant that the company was not represented at the trial.
- 3. Justice Martin has not taken the oath of allegiance and therefore does not hold a valid appointment as a justice of the Supreme Court of Western Australia and is without authority in the judgments that he has handed down in this case or any other case.
- 4. Justice Martin is an employee of the Department of the Attorney General of Western Australia (ABN 705879443) a subsidiary company of the Corporation of Western Australia (ABN 072526002) and not an officer of the Crown.
- 5. Despite repeated requests to the court he was denied trial by jury.
Newnes JA and Murphy JA briefly addressed each of the grounds noting that all but one ground has already been rejected in his previous cases, concluding none of the grounds of appeal had a reasonable prospect of success, and the application was dismissed.
One of his followers filmed parts of this proceeding, with Wayne Glew displaying the same sort of contempt of court as had occurred a few months later at the hearing on 5 July 2012.
The West Australian: “Inventor to pay $2m damages to investor“:
(16) Wayne Glew had been a claimant, defendant or appellant in at least 16 Court proceedings in which he has argued against the validity of the Australian legal system. He has not been successful in a single proceeding to date. His persistent and habitual tendency to repeat the same contentions rejected in his previous cases over and over inevitably resulted in Wayne Glew being declared a vexatious litigant by Sanderson M in Attorney General (WA) v Glew [2014] WASC 100 and being prevented from initiating any further Court proceedings in Western Australia. At the commencement of the hearing, in typical fashion Wayne Glew made offensive and irrelevant comments in relation to the jurisdiction of the court. When Sanderson M indicated to him he did not propose to allow him to behave inappropriately he decided to take no further part in the proceedings and left the court.
(17) Due to the request by Pullin JA, Buss JA and Mazza JA in Glew v White [2012] WASCA 138, (at 14) that the Attorney General consider making an application under section 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA), the Attorney General for Western Australia, Michael Mischin, had applied to the court for an order that:
“The Contemnor, Wayne Kenneth Glew, be committed to prison and/or required to pay a fine for contempt of court in the face of the Court of Appeal during and upon the conclusion of an appeal hearing on 5 July 2012.”
In Re Glew; ex parte the Hon Michael Mischin MLC, Attorney General (WA) [2014] WASC 107, Em Heenan J explained in reasons the contempt of court that occurred on 5 July 2012, along with a transcript of the statements. Wayne Glew had made assertions that he was “charging” the justices of the Court of Appeal with “fraud” and “treason” among other abusive, offensive, and threatening remarks, in an aggressive and intimidating demeanour. (at 59):
“When told that if he did not address the proposed grounds of appeal the court would adjourn and decide the matter on the papers, he responded by saying that if the court did that he would formally charge the judges as he claimed to be entitled to do as a Commonwealth public official. This was absurd histrionics. He is not, and was not, a Commonwealth official; there was no basis for charging anyone and his remarks were nothing less than preposterous. The incongruity of Mr Glew’s contentions, and of his claims, was plainly obvious to their Honours and must have been obvious to any fair-minded, reasonable observer. No such observer could attach any credit or plausibility to Mr Glew’s behaviour, which was that of an ignorant man disastrously pursuing his own obsession. From there the situation did not improve. Mr Glew reverted to his idiosyncratic theme that there was no lawful governor for the State of Western Australia; that certain legislation was not valid; and that the constitutional arrangements for executive and legislative power in Western Australia were defective.”
(18) In keeping true to the pattern of litigation failure and subsequent appeal stretching back from Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260 onwards, the decision to declare Wayne Glew a vexatious litigant was also appealed in Glew v Attorney General (WA) [2014] WASCA 93 and was also dismissed.
Glew provided legal advice to Heather Glendinning, who killed herself and her two daughters in a murder–suicide in 2011. He subsequently told The West Australian that she had been murdered, and that “I spent 17 years in the police and you can make anything look like anything”. The West Australian: “Ex-cop helped mum fight law“:
Wayne Glew keeps a high public profile, calls himself “The Talking Bulldog” you can find a plethora of his videos on the Internet. He also posts regularly on his Facebook page.
“On the 22’nd of September 2014 the registered CPO’s of Western Australia filed in the High Court register Perth 1. Writ of Mandamus 2. Writ of Prohibition against the corporation of the State Government of Western Australia and Colin Barnett. WRIT OF MANDAMUS This Writ commands you to dissolve the company known as the State Government of Western Australia ABN 072526008 and remove yourself and all other so called Politicians from our Parliament. And further you are commanded to remove Wayne Stuart Martin, John McKechnie and the so called Governor of Western Australia from our Governing bodies or show cause why it has not been done. Further you are commanded to stop personating an Officer of the Crown and a lawful Government contrary to section 271 Commonwealth Criminal Code. YOU ARE REQUIRED TO make a return to this Writ by filing a notice on or before 3rd October 2014 stating whether you have done what you are commended to do by this Writ or stating why it has not been done. TAKE NOTICE that disobeying this Writ is a contempt of Court which may be punished by imprisonment, fine or both.”
Wayne Glew loses his property for rates arrears
The endless vexatious challenges and non-payment of the rates on his land eventually caught up with Wayne Glew, on 8 August 2017, the City of Greater Geraldton took possession of his property under section 6.64 of the Local Government Act 1995 (WA):
According to Domain.com, 1004 Chapman Road Glenfield WA 6532 was subsequently listed for sale on 7 December 2017, shortly after this seizure, and according to Realestate.com, it first sold in March 2019, and then it sold again in April 2020.
The City of Greater Geraldton Council published this Public Notice on 13 December 2018, regarding the seizure of Wayne Glew’s property for rates arrears on 8 August 2017.
The ABC subsequently published the article: “WA man has his property seized because he refuses to pay $300,000 owing in rates” on 19 December 2018:
Of course, Wayne Glew did not recognise the authority of City of Greater Geraldton Council to do so, and has consistently denied ever since that the property has been seized by council. Instead, he used the proceedings in the Geraldton Magistrates Court in January 2019, instituted solely to recover items left on the property, as a platform for his arguments about the absence of council authority to seize the property, arguments of which had mostly already been rejected in Shoalhaven City Council v Ellis [2012] NSWLEC 225 and his own prior cases above.
Wayne Glew claims the case didn’t decide the council could seize the property, quoting Magistrate Chris Miocevich saying he had “no authority to decide that question”, in his eyes meaning the property is still his. This premise is patently distorted, as the case had nothing to do with the validity of the seizure in the first place, only regarding the items left on it. The property had already been seized over a year before the case.
After Wayne Glew refused to submit an affidavit regarding details on items and their owners, Magistrate Chris Miocevich ordered he pay $1800.40 in costs and gave the council permission to dispose of the items as they see fit.
The West Australian: “City of Greater Geraldton v Wayne Glew: Man ejected from court gallery” and ” He continued to use the shed to earn a living” (Published 22 and 23 January 2019):
Wayne Glew continued to post via his Facebook page through early 2019 that the property is still his, that no seizure occurred, and that the outcome of the court proceedings were in his favour, because no ruling was made regarding the property. In response to this, and the constant barrage of comments from Wayne Glew’s supporters, City of Greater Geraldton Mayor Shane Van Styn posted a copy of the Duplicate Land Title on his Facebook page. He said:
“It sadly has been a long path (since 2003) for the ratepayers of Geraldton and not an outcome we wished to pursue, but we were left with no choice. Next time Mr Glew tells everyone he won, please feel free to show him this…”
UPDATE: 12 June 2019
I made the following meme for an experiment in confirmation bias. It was shared hundreds of times by supporters of Wayne Glew, without even reading the content, which I thought quite humorous, and yet they took it as gospel truth based on their pre-existing beliefs.
The Great Australian Party
Wayne Glew and Rod Culleton teamed up as candidates for the right-wing “Great Australian Party” (GAP) in the 2019 Federal Election. Based in an ideology of constitutional conspiracy and popularism, they ran on the platform that they were going to “restore the Commonwealth”.
Wayne Glew ran as a candidate in the 2019 Federal Election but left the party soon after due to ideological differences regarding the party being registered under the “corporate government”.
Incitement of Deprivation of Liberty
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Wayne Glew became notably more vocal on social media, releasing videos daily condemning various politicians for “treason” and becoming increasingly obnoxious and threatening.
In a similar fashion to Teresa van Lieshout, a group called “Velvet Revolution” had issued arrest warrants for various politicians through the Australian “common law courts” system, and were serving these “warrants” on police stations around the nation, demanding that they act to execute the arrests. Of course, they are illegitimate warrants from an unrecognised court, so there’s no chance of that. As the frustration grew, Wayne Glew released a video telling his followers to execute the warrants themselves, and use force if necessary, to arrest and detain those named pending trial.
The following day, detectives arrived at his residence with a real arrest warrant, and a search warrant, and he was arrested for suspicion of incitement to commit an indictable offence under section 553 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA), namely deprivation of liberty.
As seen in the video, Wayne Glew immediately complained that his copy of the warrant was not signed, and felt he had some positive right to see the original. His objections do not take anything from the validity of the warrant, if there is a concern it was not properly authorised, it is a matter for counsel to take up after it has been executed. Pursuant to section 13(7) of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), a search warrant is still valid even if the application was done from an area where a JP was not available in person to sign, and was approved remotely by telephone. Under subsection 8, “the copy of the original warrant or order sent, or the form of the warrant or order completed, as the case may be, under subsection (7) has the same force and effect as the original warrant or order.” Under section 42 of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), there is no requirement that a copy of a search warrant contains a signature, but merely the name of the JP that approved it.
ABC: “Geraldton man Wayne Glew charged with allegedly inciting others to arrest Mark McGowan“:
Wayne Glew appeared at Geraldton Magistrates Court on 4 March 2022 and again on 2 May 2022. Since his arrest, he has been absent from Facebook as his bail conditions state that he must not use social media.
The West Australian: “Former Geraldton cop Wayne Glew to front court on accusations he called for Premier’s arrest“:
The West Australian: “Wayne Kenneth Glew accused of inciting others to arrest Mark McGowan“:
On 8 April 2022, Wayne Glew filed an application with the High Court seeking leave to issue or file:
The application was heard by Edelman J in Glew, In the matter of an application for leave to issue or file [2022] HCATrans 101 on the 8 June 2022, who delivered a scathing judgement and refused leave.
Of course, this rejection by the High Court did little to change the minds of his followers, with their distorted views of law and of the case itself:
I had a bit of fun with this post, on the day he was due to appear at Geraldton Magistrates Court. Many of his followers believed it without question. It’s amazing how powerful confirmation bias is:
And again…
Geraldton Guardian: “Geraldton man accused of encouraging the arrest of WA Premier has High Court application dismissed“:
This was followed by several more High Court applications. By 29 June, Gordon J directed the Registrar to refuse to issue or file documents without the leave of a justice first obtained. On 13 July Wayne Glew lodged another application seeking that leave, which was refused by Keane J on 17 August 2022.
The court and criminal procedures for dealing with indictable offences in Western Australia are set out in Division 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). All indictable offences start in the Magistrates Court of Western Australia, those punishable by life imprisonment are transferred to and tried in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, and all other indictable offences are tried in the District Court of Western Australia.
They start in the Magistrates Court because a Disclosure/Committal Mention Hearing must occur before the matter is transferred to the District Court. At this hearing, the court must be satisfied the prosecution has provided full disclosure, before taking Wayne Glew’s plea. If he pleads guilty, then the matter is transferred to the District Court for a Sentence Mention Hearing pursuant to section 41(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), where if both he and the prosecution are ready to proceed to sentencing, the court will set a date for the Sentencing Hearing.
If Wayne Glew enters “any plea other than a plea of guilty or does not plead to the charge”, (which would presumably be the situation), then the matter is transferred to the District Court for a Directions Hearing pursuant to section 41(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA).
Wayne Glew appeared before Geraldton Magistrates Court on the 8th of December 2022 for that Disclosure/Committal Mention Hearing. According to this post by Yulianna Glew, they are due to appear next in the District Court in March 2023:
Most of the contentions currently being asserted by Wayne Glew are addressed in a separate article, which contains referenced responses to his videos aimed at me “Response to Wayne Glew’s Videos“
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