Tadeusz Krysiak

Tadeusz Krysiak was charged with exceeding the speed limit. At the mention and trial he sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court but was unsuccessful, and sought leave to appeal the conviction in Krysiak v Hodgson, [2009] WASC 16 1 but did not appear. The court found the grounds on the submissions were mostly incomprehensible, some described as gibberish, that a contractual relationship exists, and that the magistrates did not swear allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II and presided over a ‘Star Chamber’. The court noted:

“This appeal highlights the dangers of self‑litigation.  The appellant has made reference to a number of legal principles and authorities without apparently the slightest knowledge of their applicability.  I would stay the whole proceedings as an abuse of process in the inherent powers of the Court and, in any event, I find that there is no reasonably arguable prospect of success on any ground.”

Click to access krysiak-v-hodgson-2009-wasc-16.pdf

The appellant sought leave to appeal against this decision, which refused leave to appeal against the primary decision, in Krysiak v Hodgson, [2009] WASCA 114. 2 In a 50 draft grounds of appeal, which included the previous grounds and contended there had been a breach of the rules of natural justice in the appeal, and that there was no jurisdiction because the appellant’s surname was typed with capital letters.  Leave to appeal was refused and the appeal dismissed.

Click to access krysiak-v-hodgson-2009-wasca-114.pdf


The applicant subsequently was charged with driving while having a suspended licence due to non-payment of the fines imposed in the previous case. He filed a document entitled Notice of Reservation of Rights, asserting that he reserved his exclusive and ancient rights, including a right to jury trial, that all statutes should be in harmony with the common law, and that he was an authorised agent of the entity ‘Tadeusz‑Edmund Krysiak’ with limited liability.  He asserted that the court had no jurisdiction, that the charge should be dismissed as invalid and that there was evidence of inherent fraud. At the hearing he refused to identify himself and the magistrate directed him to sit in the back of the court, and proceeded ex parte in absence of the defendant, imposing a fine and a disqualification period.

The applicant sought leave to appeal this decision in Krysiak v McDonagh, [2012] WASC 270 3 along with another identical matter, Krysiak v Barnes, on the grounds that the magistrates had erred in law, had acted outside of and/or exceeded their jurisdiction, that there had been a miscarriage of justice. He attempted to regurgitate a series of constitutional challenges, including that the decision contravened section 92 of the Australian Constitution by restricting his freedom of travel, and the chapter III provisions by not referring the matter to the original jurisdiction of the High Court, and breached the Currency Act 1965 (Cth), by issuing a monetary penalty in Australia dollars. The leave to appeal was dismissed.

Click to access krysiak-v-mcdonagh-2012-wasc-270.pdf

In Krysiak v McDonagh, [2013] WASCA 100 4 the applicant appealed against the refusals of leave for the two convictions for drive whilst suspended, raising the same grounds as earlier. The court held none had a reasonable prospect of succeeding, leave to appeal was refused and the appeal dismissed.

Click to access krysiak-v-mcdonagh-2013-wasca-100-2.pdf

Prior to this hearing, there was Krysiak v Carruthers, [2012] WASC 472 5 in which the applicant sought leave to appeal on the same grounds, which was likewise dismissed.

Click to access krysiak-v-carruthers-2012-wasc-472.pdf

The applicant then sought leave to appeal this decision in Krysiak v Carruthers, [2013] WASCA 210, 6 on much the same grounds, which was again dismissed.

Click to access krysiak-v-carruthers-2013-wasca-210.pdf


With the assistance of her son Tadeusz Krysiak, Eugenia Krysiak had also had several unsuccessful attempts at litigation. She initially lodged a complaint with the Equal Opportunity Commission alleging that a change the local bus route constituted unlawful discrimination. The Acting Commissioner for Equal Opportunity dismissed the complaint, so it was referred to the State Administrative Tribunal, which also dismissed the proceeding on the basis that it was misconceived or lacking in substance. An injunction was sought in Krysiak v Public Transport Authority [2016] WASC 258 7 but the application was dismissed. A few days later in Krysiak v Public Transport Authority of Western Australia [2016] FCCA 2121 8 she sought another urgent injunction for alleged unlawful discrimination under the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986. The court observed that age alone is not a disability, and the application for an interim injunction was likewise dismissed. Mrs Krysiak then sought leave to appeal against the State Administrative Tribunal decision in Krysiak v Public Transport Authority [No 2] [2017] WASC 103 9 which was also dismissed. 

Up until this point the proceedings, although misconceived and frivolous, were not OPCA related. But not so in Krysiak v Public Transport Authority [No 3] [2019] WASC 163. 10 In this case the Krysiak’s applied for orders suspending the enforcement of the judgment that the applicant pay the Public Transport Authority the costs of the appeal, fixed at $4,125. The affidavits in support, one sworn by Tadeusz Krysiak, were not accepted for filing. Each of the documents bore an endorsement that they were prepared by Tadeusz Krysiak. The acting Principal Registrar directed that the proposed motion and affidavits not be accepted for filing without leave of a judge having first been obtained, as they were an abuse of process. In the documents the Krysiak’s sought to pay the costs using what was purported to be bills of exchange. 

“Insofar as the applicant seeks to claim that the judgment debt has been satisfied by her pursuant to the Bills of Exchange Act 1909 (Cth) by the tender of what is said to be bills of exchange, it is clear, having examined the documents which are claimed to be bills of exchange, that these documents are meaningless and cannot be said to constitute a contractual obligation of any form or create any right to payment to the applicant of any sum whatsoever.”

Click to access krysiak-v-public-transport-authority-no-3-2019-wasc-163.pdf

There is also the non OPCA related matter of Krysiak v Housing Authority [2019] WADC 162, 11 which concerned a dispute about a dividing fence between Eugenia Krysiak’s property,  and the bordering property which was owned by the Housing Authority. The fence fell down, and after obtaining Tadeusz Krysiak‘s agreement in writing, it was replaced by the Housing Authority who sought payment of half from the applicant. The Housing Authority lodged a general procedure claim and obtained default judgment. Tadeusz Krysiak was granted leave to appear on her behalf, and he sought to have the default judgment set aside, but was not successful.  He appealed that decision to the District Court, but was likewise dismissed. The appellant then filed an affidavit in support of an extension of time to file an appeal notice, which was heard in Krysiak v Housing Authority [2020] WASCA 119. 12 Tadeusz Krysiak was not granted leave to appear on the applicants behalf in this appeal, but it was also dismissed.