In the primary court prior to Peters v Pimm Pty Ltd  QCA 306, Daubney J, sitting as President of the Appeal Tribunal of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, found that the applicant had not proved the facts to support his claim that the computer he bought from the respondent was faulty in various ways, and the application was dismissed. He then appealed that decision, while challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal. He informed the court that he had discovered that “judges of the Australian Courts are actually employees of a company known as the Attorney-General and Justice Department who runs under an ABN” and said that “as employees of that company, the judges of the Court of Appeal cannot be judges”. Nick Peters submitted that in his view there was “an actual constitutional crisis at the moment”. For this reason he asked for the proceeding to be adjourned to a date to be fixed “after the crisis of the constitution is heard and sorted out because I understand that the constitution is being changed without a referendum of the Australian people” and that he did not wish to appear before the court as currently constituted. Sofronoff P and Philippides JA and North J dismissed the application, concluding:
“…the applicant wants to agitate a bizarre legal argument about the status of judges. That would just be vexatious. There is no merit in this application and leave to extend time to appeal should be refused.”
Just goes to show what happens when one is willfully ignorant to facts of law, and instead relies purely on beliefs that are legally unintelligible, and fail consistently in the courts.
Government departments having an ABN doesn’t make them a corporation. The Australian Business Number Act 1999 applies to a “government entity” AS IF it were an “entity”. In short, what is an “entity” for the purposes of the ABN Act may not be a separate legal entity for wider purposes”, as explained in Elston v Commonwealth of Australia  FCA 108. It simply applies for the purposes of that particular Act.
In fact, when it comes to the actual definition of a corporation for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001, section 57A(2) states:
“Neither of the following is a corporation:(a) an exempt public authority; (b) a corporation sole.”
And section 3 states: “exempt public authority” means a body corporate that is incorporated within Australia or an external Territory and is: a public authority; or an instrumentality or agency of the Crown in right of the Commonwealth, in right of a State or in right of a Territory.”
Mike Palmer of “Know Your Rights Group” in DCT v Palmer  VCC 1401:
“That the “Michael Gareth Palmer” referred to in the Writ and Statement of Claim must be a corporation or artificial entity, which is not the person who made submissions today in Court, known as Michael Gareth Palmer
Michael accepted that he was a “living breathing man” and, although he preferred to be called Michael or “Michael of the family Palmer” in Court, referred to himself on many occasions in his written submissions as “Michael Palmer”. As I understand this aspect of his submissions, he contended that: a) he was not a “person” within the meaning of the relevant legislation; and b) the DCT was not suing him, but a “corporation” created either by the issuing of a birth certificate or by the creation of a tax file number.
It is well accepted that “person” includes “natural person” or (to use Michael’s terminology) a “living breathing man”. (See Pharmaceutical Society v London and Provincial Supply Association Ltd (1880) 5 AC 857 at 861; Bennett-Hullin v Clark (TP) & Co  VLR 45 at 46.) On the face of the Writ and Statement of Claim, the DCT appears to be suing a natural person by the name of Michael Gareth Palmer rather than a corporation.
Further, Michael also swore an affidavit dated 17 May 2019 which commenced:
“I, Michael Palmer, a subject of the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, a de jure solemn et natural, living, breathing man, make oath and say as follows:
I am listed as the Defendant in these proceedings…”
On the evidence before me, I am satisfied that Michael is the named defendant to these proceedings.”
Being a trading company does though.
And obviously Michael made error of his status in his submissions.
As for definition of person.
ACTS INTERPRETATION ACT 1901 – SECT 2C
References to persons
(1) In any Act, expressions used to denote persons generally (such as “person”, “party”, “someone”, “anyone”, “no-one”, “one”, “another” and “whoever”), include a body politic or corporate as well as an individual.
(2) Express references in an Act to companies, corporations or bodies corporate do not imply that expressions in that Act, of the kind mentioned in subsection (1), do not include companies, corporations or bodies corporate.
Do you see man or woman included in the lawful reference of person?
Legal Definition of expressio unius est exclus
: a principle in statutory construction: when one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
inclusio unius est exclusio alterius a rule of interpretation that states that ‘including one excludes another’. The statement ‘no dogs allowed’ under this rule would mean that panthers were allowed.
Paul Kirchner The point regarding “persons” has long been rejected in every case it has ever arisen in. It is classed by the judiciary as among the indica of the “organised pseudo legal commercial argument”, by Associate Chief Justice John D. Rooke of Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in Meads v Meads ABQB 571, a case that is accepted as an accurate statement in law in these matters in most nations including Australia.
It has been cited in this regard in Ennis v Credit Union Australia  FCCA 1705; Kosteska v Magistrate Manthey & Anor  QCA 105; Adelaide City Council v Lepse  SASC 66; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Woods  FCCA 1815; Lion Finance Pty Ltd v Johnston  FCCA 2745; Coshott v Spencer  NSWDC 43; ACM Group Ltd v Jenner  QMC 7; Hewitt & Corbett 7 Anor  FCCA 776; K Sheridan v Colin Biggers & Paisley  NSWSC 528/621; Warren Ronald Wichman v Pepper Finance Corporation Limited  NSWCA 195; Rossiter v Adelaide City Council  SASC 61; Bauskis v Wainhouse & Ors  NSWCA 17; Petrie; Trustee of the property of Aitken (Bankrupt) v Aitken & Ors  FCCA 16; Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited v Grahame  VSC 86; Deputy Commissioner Of Taxation v Cutts (No.4)  FCCA 2866 and many more.
It is not simply Mike’s case that it was rejected, there is literally a library of cases where it has also failed for the same reasons, it has no basis in law. A corporation can be a person, but a person cannot be a corporation. Legal persons are of TWO kinds: (1) NATURAL PERSON (an individual person, or human being) (2) JURIDICAL PERSON, also called juristic, artificial or fictitious persons, who are groups of individuals, (such as corporations) which are treated by law as if they were persons, being capable of certain rights and duties.
YOUR “person” is of the first category, not the second. You are made up of one individual, not a group of individuals, such as a juridical person, or “corporation”. Juridical persons acquire their legal personhood when they are incorporated in accordance with law, whereas Natural persons do so as soon as they have a separate and independent existence from their mother by birth. (See R v Hutty  VLR 338) The application of a birth certificate DOES NOTHING to change this status to that of a “juridical person”. On the contrary, it is actually formal recognition of your status as a “natural person”. One could even register their name under the Corporations Act, (Eg. Dick Smith, Harvey Norman) but the individual remains a natural person.
As far as your interpretation of “includes” this is also false, and addressed well in Van den Hoorn v Ellis,  QDC 451:
“Additionally, there was the puzzling contention that, before the lower court, the appellant was assumed to be a “corperation [sic]” by the fact of the court accepting the alleged “capitalisation of (his) family name” which so led to him being deemed to be a “corporative fiction of limited liability” when he was “a living/breathing soul … of full liability”. Since “driver” in the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995 is defined as meaning the “person” driving the vehicle (including the “rider” of a vehicle), the appellant is not a person who falls within the Act because, from the same definitions just referred to, a person “includes” a “corporation” and the appellant is not a “corporation”. It is clear from the context of the definition – and reality – that a corporation could never drive or ride a vehicle. Such an interpretation is therefore absurd, and must be rejected. A similar fate follows from any argument that a “person” is only a fictitious legal entity.”
As far as your “trading company” assertion, it has already been addressed above. Having an ABN does not mean the entity is a corporation or “trading company”. Similarly, the regisrations of various bodies with the SEC in the US does not make them an American company. There are very distinct differences between the type of SEC registration in comparison to an actual privately owned American company (Form 10-k U.S. Company) as well as a privately owned Australian company (Form 6-k Australian Company) and that of the Australian Government, (Form 18-k annual report foreign governments). Just because names of countries appear in EDGAR does not mean that they are an American company, it means that the country is a foreign government that has issued securities for sale to U.S. investors and has therefore registered those securities.
Creatures of statute cannot be officers of the Crown – [HCA] Sydney City Council V Reid 1996 & [HCA] Allied services union of Australia & ors v Queensland rail. 2015.
It is Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 and Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Queensland Rail  HCA 11.
Now, perhaps you could provide a paragraph for your assertion, since no such statement even appears in the search results of either case. And we’ll take it from there.
I’ve seized the 3 tiers of government under magna carta last october in the supreme court after 3 supreme court judges told me they were entities that reside outside of our Constitution on record and that they were paid by the state of Queensland. These are all for profit businesses and subsidiary companies to Commonwealth of Australia registered in Washington.
Before you try to divert to another subject, deal with the assertions you have already made.
If you are seeking some sort of judicial permission to rebel, unfortunately the law does not recognise this point. Historic record shows that Clause 61 of the 1215 Magna Carta was repealed within months of it’s establishment, and therefore not included into subsequent charters. In fact, the British Parliament then repealed most of Magna Carta 1297 between 1863 and 1969 because its terms were either obsolete as they dealt with medieval circumstances that had passed into history, or because some of the problems had been addressed in later statutes.
Only chapter 29 of the 1297 Magna Carta remains unrepealed in Australian law. The ability to repeal Imperial Acts comes from the Statute of Westminster 1931. (adopted by Australia in 1942) Section 2 states:
“No law and no provision of any law made after the commencement of this Act by the Parliament of a Dominion shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England, or to the provisions of any existing or future Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Parliament of a Dominion shall include the power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or regulation in so far as the same is part of the law of the Dominion.”
For example, 6(b) of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW) declares c 29 to have remained in force in NSW “except so far as affected by any State Acts from time to time in force in New South Wales”. Chapter 29 of the Magna Carta does not hold the status of a constitutional provision of NSW, rather it is open to “affectation and modification” by ordinary legislation enacted by the State Parliament. (See Galea v NSW Egg Corporation Court of Appeal, 21 November 1989, Unreported, at 6, Adler v District Court of NSW (1990) 19 NSWLR 317 at 332; see also Chester v Bateson (1920) 1 KB 829 per Darling J).
As consistent with the Imperial Acts Application Acts of other states, only c 29 of the Magna Carta is in force in Western Australia, despite the other chapters remaining:
“Its preservation does not ensure that these rights are inalienable because statutes of the Parliament of Western Australia which are repugnant to Magna Carta are not for that reason invalid. Indeed, to the extent of any repugnancy, these statutes operate to repeal Magna Carta. Chapter 29 is one of the historical provisions which should be declared to remain in force. The other chapters should be repealed.” (Law Reform Commission – United Kingdom Statutes in Force in Western Australia)
This point has been upheld by the courts: Chia Gee v Martin (1905) 3 CLR 649 at 653: “The contention that a law of the Commonwealth is invalid because it is not in conformity with Magna Carta is not one of serious refutation.”
Wilson J. Re Cusack (1980) 60 ALJR 302: “The validity of laws enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament falls to be determined by reference to the proper construction of the Australian Constitution. It is not open to base an argument for validity by reference to alleged inconsistencies between laws of the Commonwealth and either Magna carta or the Bill of Rights.”
Carnes v Essenberg  QCA 339: “The supremacy of Parliament to make laws contrary to what had been the Common Law is expressly recognised by the Courts. It is enough to refer to the decision of the High Court in Kable v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, 189, Commonwealth Law Reports 51 at pages 73 to 74 in the judgment of Justice Dawson. His Honour pointed out that that champion of the Common Law, Chief Justice Coke, had in his Institute of the Laws of England in the early 17th century accepted that Magna Carta could be altered by English Parliament. Indeed he referred to Bills of Attainder which allowed for trial contrary to Magna Carta as being lawful enactments.”
Essenberg v The Queen  HCATrans 297: “I understand that and persons who have not had full legal training often think of Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights as fundamental documents which control governments, but they do not. After all, Magna Carta was the result of an agreement between the barons and King John and the barons themselves had their own courts, had their own armies, they, in effect, levied what we would call taxes today and they were concerned to protect themselves against the growth of the central power of the royal government, the central government, and that is how Magna Carta came into existence, but modern Parliament did not arise until late in the 17th century and the early struggle was between the King and the barons. We are dealing now with the question of the legislature. I mean, Parliament established its authority over the monarch after the struggles which led to the execution of Charles I and the flight from the kingdom of James II in 1688. But Parliament – some people would regard it as regrettable – can, in effect, do what it likes. As it is said, some authorities could legislate to have every blue-eyed baby killed if it wanted to.”
As you may or may not know, cases from the Supreme Courts are generally published on public record. If you are going to make such assertions at least provide your case as substantiation of your claims.
(1) Provide paragraph numbers in both Sydney City Council v Reid (1994) 34 NSWLR 506 and Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v Queensland Rail  HCA 11.
(2) Provide your own case citation reference.
Peters V Pimm ptyltd.
issued 78b to AG no response.
Commonwealth of Australia of washington is a foreign corporate entity.
and what of the balfour decloration?
Or the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution. What is your opinion?
Peters v Pimm Pty Ltd  QCA 306
The SEC registration is already addressed in comments above. It is false.
A matter will not arise under the Constitution if it does not really and substantially, or genuinely, arise: see ACCC v CG Berbatis Holdings  FCA 1151; (1999) 95 FCR 292 at 297; Danielsen v Onesteel Manufacturing Pty Ltd  SASC 56 at –; Pham v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations  FCAFC 179 at . A constitutional point must not be trivial or vexatious, or frivolous in the sense of being patently unarguable or completely devoid of merit. It was proper for the magistrate to deny leave to appeal.
What of the Balfour Declaration and the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution? What is your question?
I never give my opinion. I cite the relevant precedent that confirms the position of the law.
From your case, I can gather your argument surrounds the notion that “…the constitution is being changed without a referendum of the Australian people”.
Can you point out which section of the Constitution you claim has been altered, so I can address it?
The fact they arnt using it.
https://www.youtube.com/ “How the Queensland Government Stole our Democracy”
Nick Peters That is hardly a response, the Constitution is relied on by the courts every day. It is binding on every court in Australia.
I’m not interested in watching a video, I deal with final judgments of the higher courts, not YouTube videos. Can you summarize your contention?
Mike Holt has many misconceptions when it comes to the application of the law, so I can imagine the myths you have been influenced by.
While I’m waiting, I might add some information on the method the Constitution can be changed.
Section 76 of the Constitution grants original jurisdiction to the High Court in all matters relating to the interpretation of the Constitution, so it can interpret it according to changing times, such as the way section 117 is now interpreted in comparison to when it was drafted. (see Re Patterson  HCA 51; 207 CLR 391 (at 226) and Singh v Commonwealth of Australia  HCA 43 (at 131(d))
It can therefore be changed by HCA interpretation.
There are also areas where the Constitution can be changed by the Parliament without referendum. There are no less than 22 different sections where the words “until the Parliament otherwise provides” appears. (see Q&G page 647)
And then there are other sections, which enable the Parliament to further create laws, such as the limitation of Privy Council appeals in section 74, providing those laws are reserved for the monarchs pleasure.
It can therefore be changed by Parliament by subsequent enactments, in specific sections.
Of course, the text of all these sections remain exactly as they were at Federation, but the meaning and interpretation of them is changed substantially, but the changes are still nevertheless consistent with the Constitution.
The alteration of the text on the other hand, requires a section 128 referendum.
sorry i just cbf today. ill catch you later, thanks Phillip. I fought 2 court cases simultaneously from the front seat of a car where my child and i lived. denied to show evidence or have witnesses to the crimes. in both cases the respondents admitted to their crimes but we lost and i was called a liar.
lost my fulltime job, my business, my 75k car and my life.
all in a court contrary to chapter 3 of the Constitution by judges sworn in by the parliament which is a for profit business not the GG.
Local Government is not a matter involving the Constitution. It is a creature of the States, created prior to Federation, and the legislative powers to enact laws governing it are out of reach of the Commonwealth Parliament, they are residual legislative powers protected by sections 106, 107, 108, and 118 of the Constitution.
After all, the nature of federalism is the division of legislative powers into three spheres. Some were delegated to the Commonwealth, called exclusive powers, others retained by the States, called residual powers, and then there is concurrent powers which they both share, but Commonwealth laws are superior in this sphere, due to section 109.
Pages 935 and 936 of Quick & Garren’s Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth, refers to the RESIDUAL POWERS OF THE STATES. Note that “Municipal Institutions and Local Government” are under these RESIDUAL legislative powers of the states, as opposed to the EXCLUSIVE or CONCURRENT powers of the Commonwealth.
Quick and Garran go into great detail explaining this division in ss 160, “The Plenary Nature of the Powers” (pg 509), in ss 330(3) “As a Federal Constitution” (pg 794), and also ss 444 “The States” (pg 928). They state on page 794: “The Constitution draws a line between the enumerated powers assigned to the Federal Government and the residue of powers reserved to the State Governments. Both sets of Governments are limited in their sphere of action, but within their several spheres they are supreme.” On page 928, they state that there is a division of delegated sovereignty into these two spheres, neither able to intrude on the other.
For case examples, see Rossiter v Adelaide City Council  SASC 61 (At 42): “Ground 6 is a complaint that there is no constitutional recognition of local government. This has been tried by others before. (See Glew v Shire of Greenough  WASCA 260, - (Wheeler JA); Glew v Shire of Greenough  HCATrans 520, “entirely lacking in legal merit” (Gummow J); McDougall v City of Playford  SASC 169, - (Nicholson J). It is without merit. Because the 1988 constitutional referendum failed, local government remains a matter within the residual power of the States. The failure of the constitutional amendment says nothing about the legal existence and validity of local government.”
Also Nibbs v Devonport City Council  TASSC 34: “The argument ignores completely the sovereign authority of the Parliament of Tasmania, derived from imperial legislation and confirmed in the Australian Constitution to make laws binding within the territorial jurisdiction of Tasmania. The Local Government Act is such a law. The appellant fails because, as the magistrate rightly said, the argument fails to acknowledge the basic nature of a federation in the form which the Commonwealth of Australia takes. It is true that local government, as a tier of government in Australia, is not referred to in the Constitution. However, the States of Australia are sovereign states: see ss 106 and 107 of the Constitution. Section 109 renders invalid State laws to the extent that they are inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth. There is nothing to prevent States from legislating about local government. Whilst s 51(ii) enables the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws with respect to taxation, a State government is not thereby precluded from making such laws, provided there is no inconsistency.”
Also Stuart v City of Belmont  WASCA 5: “Magistrate Heaney dismissed the application on the basis that the defence that the appellant wished to advance was an absurdity, the grounds upon which that review order was sought were wholly without merit. The appellant’s argument that the respondent had no authority to impose fines due to a lack of provision for local government in the Commonwealth Constitution a nd the failure of the 1988 referendum to recognise local government in the Commonwealth Constitution had been rejected in numerous other cases: His Honour referred to: Glew v Shire of Greenough  WASCA 260–; Van Lieshout v City of Fremantle [No 2]  WASC 176; Pennicuik v City of Gosnells  WASC 63; Hargreaves v Tiggemann  WASCA 92; Glew v City of Greater Geraldton  WASCA 94.”
I am sorry to hear these theories cost you so much, it goes to show you should actually look for real factual information instead of the meanderings of vexatious litigants. The best place to learn is through reading case law surrounding any contention you might want to pursue.
I’m not sure what you think is contrary to chapter III, but unless it is a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction, chapter III doesn’t even apply anyway.
As held in QPS v Earthey  QMC 56 (from 46) the doctrine of the separation of powers does not exist in its classic form at the state level:..
“I point out that this case is heard in a State court exercising State jurisdiction, not federal jurisdiction. Therefore I do not believe this is a matter involving the Australian Constitution or involving its interpretation where Notices are required to be served on the Commonwealth and State Attorney-Generals under section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 by the defendant.
However, I note decisions of the High Court, commencing with Kable, establish the principle that a State legislature cannot confer upon a State court a function which substantially impairs its institutional integrity, and which is therefore incompatible with its role, under Ch III of the Constitution, as a repository of federal jurisdiction and as a part of the integrated Australian court system:  HCA 24; (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 96 per Toohey J, 103 per Gaudron J, 116-119 per McHugh J, 127-128 per Gummow J; HA Bachrach Pty Ltd v Queensland  HCA 54; (1998) 195 CLR 547 at 561-562 ; Baker v The Queen  HCA 45; (2004) 223 CLR 513 at 519  per Gleeson CJ; Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld)  HCA 46; (2004) 223 CLR 575 at 591  per Gleeson CJ. This constitutional principle has as its touchstone protection against legislative or executive intrusion upon the institutional integrity of the courts. The term “institutional integrity”, applied to a court, refers to its possession of the defining or essential characteristics of a court. Those characteristics include the reality and appearance of the court’s independence and its impartiality. (See Wainohu v New South Wales  HCA 24 at 107) Other defining characteristics are the application of procedural fairness and adherence, as a general rule, to the open court principle. (See Wainohu v New South Wales  HCA 24 at 109) As explained later, it is also a defining characteristic of a court that it generally gives reasons for its decisions.
Hayne J made the same point in South Australia v Totani (2010) 242 CLR 1 at 81 :
“Kable dealt with one respect in which the Constitutions of the States are affected by the federal Constitution: the legislative powers of the States are not unlimited. The relevant limitation is not one which follows from any separation of judicial and legislative functions under the Constitutions of the States. Rather, it is a consequence that follows from Ch III establishing, in Australia, ‘an integrated Australian legal system, with, at its apex, the exercise by this Court of the judicial power of the Commonwealth’.”
Nor do I believe it necessary to explain in length the Australian system of government suffice to say we have a federal system with a Constitution designed to protect the autonomy of the states and cede only particular and limited powers to the federation. It does this by prescribing the powers of the federal government with the residual powers left to the states.
Generally, the parliament of Queensland has plenary power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State subject to express and implied limitations from the Commonwealth Constitution and the Australia Act 1986 which leaves that State the freedom to legislate on the terms chosen by them: Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1 at 9-10; 82 ALR 43; 62 ALJR 645. It would be ‘almost impossible to use wider or less restrictive language’ than the phrase ‘peace, welfare (or order) and good government’: McCawley v R (1920) 28 CLR 106;  AC 691 at 712; (1920) per Lord Birkenhead, PC. See also Ibralebbe v R  AC 900 at 923;  1 All ER 251;  2 WLR 76 per Viscount Radcliffe. They have been held to admit of no inquiry by the courts as to whether, as a matter of fact or law, a particular statute is or is not a prudent exercise of the power, or is calculated to attain its particular end or object: Riel v The Queen (1885) 10 App Cas 673, 678; Bone v. Mothershaw  QCA 120 per McPherson JA at page 4.
As to what I think Mr Earthey is saying is the facilitation of proof provisions removes the capacity of the court to exercise its judicial function in that it interferes with the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof.
This, I infer because Mr Earthey has cited the Cambodian “Boat People” case, breaches the doctrine of the separation of powers which refers to the distinct separation of the three branches of Government – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. The legislature exercising legislative power enacts the laws, the executive exercising executive power administers the laws and the judiciary through the exercise of judicial power, interprets and adjudicates upon the laws.
The Defendant’s submissions are based on a misapprehension. The doctrine of the separation of powers does not exist in its classic form at the state level: Gilbertson v Attorney-General (SA)  AC 772, 783; (1977) 14 ALR 429; 51 ALJR 519; City of Collingwood v Victoria (No 2)  1 VR 652. The relevant provisions of the Constitution of Queensland 2001 are very different to the provisions of the Commonwealth Constitution.
It is well established that Parliament may legislate to prescribe rules of evidence or procedure, and to cast a burden of proof on a defendant in relation to an element of an offence, without in any way infringing upon the separation of powers. For example, High Court case law upholds the power of parliament to change the onus of proof (Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95; (1927) 33 ALR 13; Milicevic v Campbell (1975) 132 CLR 307) in a criminal case or to declare that a state of facts is presumed to exist: R v Hush; Ex parte Devanny (1932) 48 CLR 487. In Commonwealth v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners (1922) 31 CLR 1 at 12; 28 ALR 325, Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ said that a law does not usurp judicial power simply because it regulates “the method or burden of proving facts”.
In Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188-189, Brennan CJ said that: The practice and procedure of a court may be prescribed by the court in exercise of its implied power to do what is necessary for the exercise of its jurisdiction but subject to overriding legislative provision governing that practice or procedure…A law prescribing a rule of evidence does not impair the curial function of finding facts, applying the law or exercising any available discretion in making the judgment or order which is the end and purpose of the exercise of judicial power.”
No worries mate, I simply deal in facts, in an internet full of myths. It is great to be appreciated. Likewise, I appreciate that Deno Budimir and Paul Kirchner have finally realized that Wayne Glew is not correct in his assertions regarding the different versions of Quick and Garran. Wayne is after all, a vexatious litigant, so it is obvious he believes certain things that have no basis in law, and in this case, even fact. I hope it is the start of a greater realization of many other similar inconsistencies, which is why I do what I do. Too many have lost everything in the courts following these doomed to fail strategies, it is beyond time people stop spruiking myths that ultimately case others harm.
Nick Peters I was just reading the comments on your post that was shared here. It seems that you still have these beliefs, despite comprehensive evidence to the contrary. This is a fundamental obstacle in achieving anything in the courts. When something has no basis in law, it simply cannot be accepted.
Your argument seems to be based around the notion that governments and departments, as well as police, are “trading companies”. This is unfortunately something that has no basis in law or fact, as already outlined in my comments above. Both the reasons for, and effect of the SEC registration, and the fact that having an ABN doesn’t mean the entity is a trading company, have already been addressed, along with supportive references.
It seems you are very upset about something that you cannot even establish with fact, and that is a very unfortunate position to be in, and definitely not good for your mental well being. If an unsubstantiated belief is causing you this much grief, I think it is best you reevaluate your beliefs. Life is far too short to be that influenced by things you have absolutely no evidence for.
Talking of basis in law, can you show where the Australian Government has basis in Law?
Can you point to where in the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act that the Australian Government is stated as being the governing authority?
Can you explain why on the 2nd of July 1973 the Commonwealth was removed from the government title on the gazettes?
Can you explain why the Commonwealth was also removed from post 1973 notes, and that post 1973 notes became legal tender in Australia?
Paul Kirchner Put simply, “Commonwealth” refers to the type of nation created by federation. Our Constitution was written over a period of about a decade before we federated in 1901. It is said that Henry Parkes, affectionately known as the father of federation, suggested the term “Commonwealth” when the drafting process of the Constitution was beginning. A vote was taken and a substantial majority of the delegates at the 1891 Constitutional Convention in Sydney accepted the name “Commonwealth of Australia”. At the later Constitutional Conventions there were other potential names suggested. In the 1901 Commentaries on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, Quick and Garran wrote:
“Other names were submitted for consideration before federation, such as “United Australia,” “Federated Australia,” “The Australian Dominion,” “The Federated States of Australia” etc, but the name “Commonwealth” was generally accepted as the description of the federal unit.”
Webster Dictionary in 1901 defined “Commonwealth”:
“A Commonwealth is a State consisting of a certain number of men united by compact, or tacit agreement under one form of government and one system of laws. It is applied more appropriately to governments which are considered free or popular, but rarely or improperly to absolute governments. Strictly, it means a government in which the general welfare is regarded rather than the welfare of any particular class.”
Webster’s (now known as Merriam Webster) mentioned the phrase “the common good” when defining a “Commonwealth”:
“A commonwealth is a nation, state, or other political unit: such as: a)one founded on law and united by compact or tacit agreement of the people for the common good. b)one in which supreme authority is vested in the people. c)republic.”
But back at federation, mentioning republicanism was a sure-fire way to get yourself removed from public life. Hence a few delegates dissented on the vote to call our country the “Commonwealth of Australia”:
“The only objections raised to it being that it was suggestive of republicanism, owing to its association with the Commonwealth of England, under Oliver Cromwell’s Protectorate.”
But Maitland rejoiced in the return of the term “Commonwealth”. He wrote in 1901:
“There is no cause for despair when ‘the people of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Queensland and Tasmania, humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’. We may miss the old words that were used of Connecticut and Rhode Island: ‘one body corporate and politic in fact and name’; but ‘united in a Federal Commonwealth under the name of the Commonwealth of Australia’ seems amply to fill their place. And a body politic may be a member of another body politic.”
So ultimately, “Commonwealth” describes the type of nation. And it’s name? “Australia”. The Commonwealth of… Australia… It is called “Australia”, no matter what one wants to call the federation of colonies it was composed of. And so logically, it follows that the government of this “Australia” is called… “The Australian Government”…
Sorry i just read all that. Maybe you could explain when 3 supreme court judges told me they are paid by the state of Queensland as entities outside our supreme laws namingly section 5 of the Constitution.
Or maybe why every politician in Australian Government have family connects in freemasonry or why all politicians are lawyers and fat businessmen who see a mass increase in their own wealth by being a part of the club.
Or maybe way a chief justice of the high court would make the statement that the government in fact had no basis in law. You see, i completely understand citizenship now and how it places mankind as creator of the Constitution which allowed the creation of Commonwealth of Australia Parliament to be lower than state government and under servitude to state by way of citizenship. Deception or complete unawareness was obtained by citizenship contract shortly after being born so the man/woman never questions this contract and is brought up only being taught to be dependant on the state and not self reliant.
Nick Peters Who do think they should be paid by, if not the State that they are the judicial branch of? Acting outside a section of the Constitution that deals with the prorogation and dissolution of Sessions of the Commonwealth Parliament? Neither of those questions make any sense, want to elaborate?
The comment relating to freemasonry isn’t really a legal question either, although it was rejected in Brian Shaw’s cases as being an assertion without any evidence.
Your next comment seems to refer to a letter that is falsely attributed to Sir Harry Gibbs. I hope you realise that this is not in any way substantiated, some of those websites mentioning it actually admit this fact.
It is ultimately an insult to his career, considering he had numerous times been cited in the Court as having a very clear understanding of the changes in constitutional relations with the UK. I prefer reading case law from the man himself than fake letters dishonoring his memory.
A statement by Gibbs J in Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia:
“Finally, reliance was placed on the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Cth) by which the assent of the Parliament was given to the adoption by Her Majesty for use in relation to Australia and its territories, of the following style and titles: “Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God Queen of Australia and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth.” It is right to say that this alteration in Her Majesty’s style and titles was a formal recognition of the changes that had occured in the constitutional relations between the United Kingdom and Australia. For reasons already given those changes had no effect whatever on that part of the law of South Australia which confers a right of appeal to the Privy Council. The changes occurred as the result of an orderly development – not as the result of a revolution.” (at p261)
oh right. You chose to dodge the questions.
very well. I stand in the federal with my authority as naked owner of these land under the blessing of almighty God now.
Enjoy your shackles.
Living have jurisdiction over the dead mate. I am not that dead entity anymore and i should always have been given the choice.
Instead of rambling, want to address my questions? Who do think they should be paid by, if not the State that they are the judicial branch of? Acting outside a section of the Constitution that deals with the prorogation and dissolution of Sessions of the Commonwealth Parliament? Neither of those questions make any sense, want to elaborate?
“The constitution of this federation will not be charged with the duty of resisting privileged classes, for the whole power will be vested in the people themselves. They are the complete legislative power of the whole of these colonies, and they shall be so. From them will rise, first of all, the federal constitution which we are proposing to establish, and in the next place will come the legislative powers of the several colonies. The people will be the authority above and beyond the separate legislatures.” ~Andrew Joseph Thynne~
but not if the federal body of people are placed under the state by way of citizenship hey mate/
If they are unknowingly consenting to be slaves.
What is it that you do?
I don’t see any answers to those questions I asked you to clarify. I do see a lot of personal assertions and conclusions though, and an alleged quote from Andrew Joseph Thynne, which although I’ve never read before, I really don’t understand its relevance to your questions here. Perhaps you should elaborate. Try to deal with this is a rational approach, not such an emotive context.
As far as myself goes, and my own life, it really isn’t relevant to the discussion, but it will suffice to say I am far from shackled. I live on an off grid fully self sufficient farm I built from scratch, in a very remote area surrounded by mountains beside one of the cleanest rivers in Australia. We grow and make everything ourselves, including all the meats and dairy products, and a field of grain. I don’t even need to go to town, let alone have issues with police and courts. I live the existence many can only dream of.
I will however address your citizenship assertion, along with what appears to be the notion of detaching yourself from it. I have already addressed the “strawman” notion in my second comment in this thread. You seem to under the misconception that non-citizens have no legal capacity, and therefore by renouncing citizenship you are granted immunity.
The acquisition of citizenship in history has been by two methods: by blood (jus sanguinis) or by soil (jus soli). If one of the parents is an Australian citizen, as is most often the case here, then the child is automatically an Australian citizen by descent, especially since they were born on Australian soil. If they were born overseas they would have to apply for citizenship by descent. A child of a citizen born on Australian soil, covers both of these doctrines of law. Adding to this the ratio in R v Hutty  VLR 338, such a child both has a “person” and is an “Australian citizen”, even before the umbilical cord is cut, regardless of any birth certificate.
Revoking ones citizenship is a complicated process, One cannot renounce their citizenship without becoming a citizen of another nation. According to the Home Affairs website:
“Eligibility – your application to renounce Australian citizenship will not be approved unless you are or will be a citizen of another country.”
This is pursuant to Article 7 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
“Laws for the renunciation of a nationality shall be conditional upon a person’s acquisition or possession of another nationality.”
So while you might believe you aren’t a citizen, the law certainly cannot agree with you.
Secondly, only a few years ago the High Court held an injunction in the interests of protecting 150 non-citizens being held on a ship off the Australian coast. Obviously Australian law protects non-citizens. Non-Citizens can also be charged with criminal offenses, and may be deported if they commit a crime with a sentence of greater than one year: s 201 Migration Act 1958 (Cth). ‘Unlawful’ non-citizens are automatically detained: s 189 Migration Act.
Looking at the precedents, it is also refuted by the basic common law principle that all are equal before the law. As held in Walker v NSW (1994) 126 ALR 321 in relation to the exact same contention:
“The proposition must be rejected. It is a basic principle that all people should stand equal before the law. A construction which results in different criminal sanctions applying to different persons for the same conduct offends that basic principle (See Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), s.10). The general rule is that an enactment applies to all persons and matters within the territory to which it extends, but not to any other persons and matters (Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 2nd ed. (1992) at 255). The rule extends not only to all persons ordinarily resident within the country, but also to foreigners temporarily visiting (Re Sawers; ex parte Blain (1879) 12 Ch D 522 at 526; Gold Star Publications Ltd. v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1981) 1 WLR 732 at 734). And just as all persons in the country enjoy the benefits of domestic laws from which they are not expressly excluded, so also must they accept the burdens those laws impose (Bennion, op. cit. at 260). The presumption applies with added force in the case of the criminal law, which is inherently universal in its operation, and whose aims would otherwise be frustrated.”
ABN = Australian Business Number – what is the purpose of a business? The primary purpose of a business is to maximize profits for its owners or stakeholders while maintaining corporate social responsibility.
In regards to the JADE link of my case, the name NICHOLAS PETERS there doesn’t seem to be a styles manuel on those symbols being a form of American sign language or debased latin and not in english. Would that make it a fraud against me?
It would also pay you to note that PIMM pty ltd pulled out of the case by email to the court yet the court sort to bring the employee of PIMM to speak regardless.
Imagine having the power to make any question of authority vexatious.
ABN = Australian Business Number. Yes, for the purposes of the Australian Business Number Act 1999, it applies to a “government entity” AS IF it were an “entity” for that particular Act, but not for wider purposes, as explained in Elston v Commonwealth of Australia  FCA 108 and addressed as such above.
If any type of department has staff that they have to allocate wages, or have expenditure which they would be subject to GST, they require an ABN number to pay wages as well as gain an exemption from the GST surcharges under the new tax system. As stated, it is specifically for the purposes of that particular Act, but not for wider purposes.
As far as the notion of glossa dog latin or debased latin, these are concepts that are ultimately related to the all-capital letters myth that has been rejected by the courts for decades along with the strawman notion that carried it. If you understood the historic origin of these notions, you would find they are creations of the white supremacist US Posse Comitatus Movement of the 1970’s, the basis of most OPCA thought.
However, the glossa is a recent creation by Romley Stover, his reference relates to transcribing sign language for the deaf, and “glossa” really means little more than a footnote. It is quite ridiculous when one sees it for what it really is. It is also close to many of David Wynn Miller’s theories, but neither have ever succeeded in the courts, because they have no basis in fact, let alone law.
Maksacheff v Commonwealth Bank of Australia  NSWCA 126: (at 53) “Mr and Mrs Maksacheff’s written submissions also assert that there were various deficiencies in the Bank’s supporting affidavits and the judgments of the courts below, to the effect that the differing languages and fonts appearing in the judgments proved “deception by this arbitral tribunal that appears not a Court of competent jurisdiction or have subject matter jurisdiction” [sic, as in original] and that the pro-forma “Judgement/Order” documents contain “unreadable hidden languages, which appears to be dog latin/Glossa” and are illegitimate for want of a signature of a Supreme Court Justice. The submissions also refer to “symbolism” and the use of “hidden language” by the Bank, which is alleged to be an attempt to deceive Mr and Mrs Maksacheff and to constitute fraud.
As will be manifest, these assertions are nonsensical. Neither appears to advance comprehensible claims. We reproduce them, not to imbue them with any substance, but, rather, to illustrate their nonsensical nature.”
Rambaldi & anor v Rice Bar Restaurant & anor  VSC 218 (at 27): “On 4 January 2018 the defendant filed an affidavit sworn by him on 28 December 2017. The affidavit is rambling, nonsensical and, aside from the occasional assertion in respect of matters the subject of this claim, is unresponsive to Mr Rambaldi’s affidavit of 7 December 2017. By way of example in this regard, an extract of the defendant’s affidavit:
We make this “special appearance” before this honourable court, to assist the court in distinguishing between ourselves: Kim Huit living spirit of the House Tang and KIM HUIT TANG (and all the derivatives and variation in the spelling of the said name (CORPORATION SOLE), in DOG-LATIN of the grammatical fact stating that such NAME written in DOG-LATIN-GLOSSA style in any of your documents are Corrupt and Criminal, our appearance before the court must not be construed as volunteering or consenting to the Plaintiff or the court jurisdiction.”
There are many others in relation to this notion, including Wollongong City Council v Falamaki  FMCA 1204, and  NSWLEC 66.
Yes I noticed in Peters v Pimm Pty Ltd  QCA 306 the respondent didn’t appear. I would suggest that an application for summary dismissal was lodged, based on the submissions. I agree however that the assertions were inarguable and vexatious, since they have all been dealt with in previous mainly High Court cases which are binding on the court.
It is somewhat unfortunate that judges must deal with the issues that have legal merit, and simply disregard those that don’t, but to spend valuable court time doing so would amount to an abuse of process, and they are not permitted by law to entertain such concepts but simply uphold the law. Really, if it wasn’t for me explaining these things to you, you probably would be forever wondering the real responses that could of been given.
Take for example your arguments that would “agitate a bizarre legal argument about the status of judges”. I can only assume, but if it was regarding their oaths, either because their oath is to the Queen of Australia not the Queen of the United Kingdom, or in reference to certain States, their oath is to the people of that State, these arguments are doomed before you even start.
The first premise regarding the divisibility of the Crown, has already been rejected in a large number of cases and characterised over a period of almost 17 years as having no basis in law by Commonwealth courts: Joosse & Anor v Australian Securities and Investment Commission  HCA 77; (1998) 159 ALR 260; Helljay Investments Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation  HCA 56; McKewin’s Hairdressing and Beauty Supplies Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation  HCA 27; (2000) 171 ALR 335; and State courts: Hedley v Spivey  WASC 325 ; Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General & Anor  WASCA 231; Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough  WASCA 260 (special leave refused: Glew v Shire of Greenough  HCATrans 520); Glew Technologies Pty Ltd v Department of Planning and Infrastructure  WASCA 289; Glew v City of Greater Geraldton  WASCA 94; Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd  WASCA 93; Krysiak v Hodgson  WASCA 114; Glew v The Governor of Western Australia  WASC 14; Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd  WASCA 87; O’Connell v The State of Western Australia  WASCA 96 ; Hedley v Spivey  WASCA 116; Bell v Cribb  WASCA 234; and also by courts in other jurisdictions: Meads v Meads  ABQB 571, and by the British High Court in R v. Foreign Secretary ex parte Indian Association of Alberta  1 QB 892 and Fitzgibbon v HM Attorney General  EWHC 114 (Ch).
The second premise has also been rejected in many cases including Balwyn Nominees Pty Ltd v Culleton  FCA1578, Culleton  FCA 1193, Shaw v Jim McGinty in his capacity as Attorney General & Anor  WASCA 231, upholdingShaw v Attorney General for the State of Western Australia & Anor  WASC 149; Glew & Anor v Shire of Greenough  WASCA 260; Glew v The Governor of Western Australia (2009) 222 FLR 416;  WASC 14, and Nibbs v Devonport City Council  TASSC 34.
In Glew v Shire of Greenough, Wheeler JA (with whom Pullin and Buss JJA agreed) observed, at  and , that 2003 State legislation bringing about the change in terminology did not effect any change to constitutional reality. It did not attempt to alter the relationship between the Crown and the various bodies contained within the Acts amended. Her Honour said: “There is no constitutional prohibition upon the alteration of the terminology which refers to the Crown or to her Majesty. Further, the changes of terminology contained within the Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 are consistent with constitutional reality”.
The principle commonly known as the ‘presumption of regularity’ is that where the exercise of a power or the performance of an act by a public officer or public authority is proved, it will be presumed that the preconditions to the lawful exercise of that power or performance of that act have been met. See McLean Bros & Rigg Ltd v Grice  HCA 1; (1906) 4 CLR 835 at 560.
In Minister for Natural Resources v New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154, McHugh JA at 164 said:
“Where a public official or authority purports to exercise a power or to do an act in the course of his or its duties, a presumption arises that all conditions necessary to the exercise of that power or the doing of that act have been fulfilled. Thus a person who acts in a public office is presumed to have been validly appointed to that office.”
(See also M’Gahey v Alston  EngR 150; (1836) 2 M & W 206 at 211;  EngR 150; 150 ER 731 at 733; R v Brewer  HCA 33; (1942) 66 CLR 535 at 548; Hardess v Beaumont  VicLawRp 46;  VLR 315 at 318-319.)
The second answer is that in any event, the doctrine known as the ‘de facto officer doctrine’ would undoubtedly apply. G J Coles v Retail Trade Industrial Tribunal (1986) 7 NSWLR 503 per McHugh JA at 515:
“The acts of a de facto public officer done in apparent execution of his office cannot be challenged on the ground that he has no title to the office. It matters not that his appointment to the office was defective or has expired or in some cases even that he is a usurper.”
As his Honour demonstrated in his analysis in that case, and as demonstrated in the discussion by Crawford J (as he then was) in Official Trustee v Byrne  Tas SR 1 at 13-15, the principle applies to judicial officers. The three conditions necessary for the operation of the doctrine apply in this case. The office of a magistrate is one which existed in law. The acts of the magistrate in hearing and determining the application for summary judgment were within the scope and authority of the office of a magistrate. Lastly, the doctrine should properly be applied in the public interest: see generally Jamieson v McKenna  WASCA 325 at - .
I hope you learned something from this interaction, not many educated in these things take the time to provide such referenced responses, so I hope at the very least you appreciate my input.
By the way, I don’t agree with the law myself, my personal philosophies lean more towards anarchist schools of thought, extreme individualism and voluntarism. But of course, I have the serenity to accept that my personal philosophy is unconstitutional, and would no doubt be rejected by the courts. But that is the code I live by, and my motives for doing what I do.
I hope you feel better about things, for your own sake and that of your daughter. I know what it’s like, I’ve also raised a son and daughter as a single parent, alone from their births onward, as well as homeschooling them both. They are now teenagers, and doing very well.
Feel free to ask me any further questions, either here or by message. Or if you like you can browse the index of my fully referenced encyclopedia on OPCA and constitutional theory.
Unfortunately, our conversation did not have any impact on his indoctrination, he ignored all of these referenced responses and continued in his belief system, treating every interaction with police and the courts through this flawed perception.
At this point he began posting photos of the various magistrates along with posts alleging various criminal inferences.
It appears that Nick Peters thinks he had “formally arrested” Magistrate Stephanie Tonkin at a court hearing on 14 September after being brought in on a warrant.
Nick Peters went on to “arrest” another magistrate in June 2021. Due to the ongoing behaviour, especially the in-court demonstration and social media allegations of various other magistrates, he was detained for assessment under the Mental Health Act. The Reasons stated were:
“Persecutory delusional belief that the Knights Templar, the Vatican and the United Nations are involved in a military occupation of Australia and are trying to control all aspects of life and wellbeing. Has refused to sign Centrelink forms as a result leading to him having no funds and facing possible eviction. Lacks Insight. Does not believe he is suffering from mental illness requiring treatment and is unreasonably refusing to accept any as a result. Risk of serious mental deterioration.”
Of course, the first thing that Nick Peters noticed about this form was his surname in all capital letters.