Peter Scott Haughton

Peter Scott Haughton ran a series of cases in 2019-2021, heavily influenced by the assertions of a range of constitutional theorists. His story is a sad tale of ruin due to the adoption of the OPCA mindset, from successful businessman to a bankrupt. According to Dun & Bradstreet “The Trustee for Peter Haughton Family Trust Company Profile” Peter Haughton was a very successful businessman prior to his influence by OPCA concepts, with an annual turnover in excess of a million dollars.  Afterwards however, the following was published on Insolvency Notices:


In Haughton v Roder [2019] SASC 199 (22 November 2019) Peter Haughton appealed the decision of a Magistrate in dismissing information alleging that an Auxiliary Master of the Supreme Court of South Australia had committed the criminal offences of “misprision of treason and common law fraud” for making an order for possession of his property in proceedings brought by Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. He made numerous submissions, including that “…the Crown and Queen had been removed from established law within the Commonwealth”. Kelly J reminded him that:

“A judicial officer is immune both civilly and criminally for words spoken in office. Section 110C(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) provides that a master has the same privileges and immunities from liability as a judge. (See R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 54, 56; 98 ER 529, 530; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12.)”

“The Acts Amendment and Repeal (Courts and Legal Practice) Act 2003 (WA), which features repeatedly in the documents filed by the appellant, is not relevant to this appeal. Insofar as it might be relevant, that act has been found to be validly enacted. There is no merit in any argument that Auxiliary Master Roder committed any kind of fraud or concealment at common law or otherwise in relation to any aspect of the enactment of a publicly enacted valid act or of the act itself. Proceedings of the same or similar nature brought in this State or elsewhere in Australia have been unsuccessful. (See Glew v Governor of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 123; Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v Shaw [2007] VSC 148; Daniels v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2007] SASC 114.

It was also noted that:

“In this regard, I note that pending the disposition of this appeal the Court received a request from the Central Assessment Unit of the Department for Human Services (DHS) to inspect the Magistrates Court file relating to the appellant’s action against Mr Roder in the Christies Beach Magistrates Court. That request was purportedly made under s 37 and s 38 of the Child Safety (Prohibited Persons) Act 2016 (SA) which obliges public sector agencies and other persons to provide information relating to persons who are the subject of a working with children check. Consequent on the appellant’s filing of the Magistrates Court action against the respondent, the South Australian Police notified the Central Assessment Unit that the respondent may present a risk of harm to children which could impact a clearance status potentially issued by DHS. I have gone into detail about this request as it is obvious that the unfounded, abusive, vexatious and frivolous proceedings brought by the appellant in the Christies Beach Magistrates Court have resulted in such a request being made which could have potentially serious effects on the personal and business lives of not just the current respondent, but any respondent unfortunate enough to be named in proceedings by the appellant. For these reasons, I consider that an order should be made, and insofar as I am empowered to do so, that these proceedings be struck from the record.”

Haughton v Chapman [2019] SASC 200 (Also 22 November 2019) ran along similar lines, but that the Attorney-General for the State of South Australia, had committed the criminal offence of “misprision of treason”.

“The appellant on appeal relies on very similar and some identical grounds of appeal which I have already set out in full in the related appeal of Haughton v Roder.  It is unnecessary to deal with each of the appellant’s appeal grounds again as those appeal grounds have been comprehensively dealt with in the matter of Haughton v Roder.”

Haughton v Australia And New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2019] SASC 198 (Also 22 November 2019) related to the appeal against the order granting possession to Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. There were numerous grounds of appeal, grounds 1 to 3 can be distilled to complaints of fraud on the part of the Bank and a breach of clause 27 of the Code of Banking Practice in respect of the loan application, grounds 4 to 8 are various complaints made relating to the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Court to hear the claims.

Peter Haughton also contended that the Commonwealth Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 was invalid because it purported to create a “Queen of Australia” and legislation passed since then was invalid because it was assented to in the name of an office that does not exist.  Further, it was said that all appointments since then – gubernatorial, parliamentary and judicial, were invalid because an oath had been taken to an office that did not exist. Another argument was that, if a writ of habeas corpus were to be issued to bring the body of the Queen of Australia to the Court, there would be no return, because there is no such person. Kelly J referred to Joosse v Australian Securities & Investment Commission (1998) 159 ALR 260 and Petrie, Trustee of the Property of Aitken (Bankrupt) v Aitken & Ors [2019] FCCA 16 to conclude that his argument was seriously misconceived, and noted a similar argument was rejected in Sill v City of Wodonga [2018] VSCA 195. Kelly J also cited Southern Centre of Theosophy Inc v South Australia (1979) 145 CLR 246 (at 261):

“It is right to say that this alteration in Her Majesty’s style and titles was a formal recognition of the changes that had occurred in the constitutional relations between the United Kingdom and Australia. For reasons already given those changes had no effect whatever on that part of the law of South Australia which confers a right of appeal to the Privy Council. The changes occurred as the result of an orderly development – not as the result of a revolution.”

Peter Haughton sought leave to appeal this decision before the Full Court in Haughton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2020] SASCFC 14 (27 February 2020) Kourakis J, Nicholson J and Lovell J responded:

“The application for permission to appeal is devoid of any merit.  We dismiss it.”

Peter Haughton leased land from Mr Chang and Ms Kiew in 2013, but was in arrears for $21,254.42 by 2015.  The Chang’s instructed their solicitors to terminate the agreement and to serve a notice of re-entry.  The locks were changed on the premises and Mr Chang and Ms Kiew resumed possession. Mr Haughton paid the outstanding invoice afterwards, but this did not resolve the matter. Proceedings were issued by Peter Haughton in July 2015, saying that Mr Chang and Ms Kiew had unlawfully terminated the agreement, which was transferred to the District Court on the application of Peter Haughton in October 2016, and the matter then had a slow progress through various interlocutory procedures including the filing of new pleadings by both parties, until it was set for trial in July 2020 in Haughton v Chang [2020] SADC 94

“Mr Haughton attended on the first day of trial with a large group of people that he described as amicus curiae.  … At the outset, Mr Haughton sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the Court to hear his action.  He did not explain why he had not raised this by way of application or amendment of his pleadings.  When pressed he said that he did not intend to address or call any evidence concerning the substantive issues raised in his pleadings against the Changs.  It was pointed out to Mr Haughton that he had issued the proceedings against Mr Chang and Ms Kiew; he had invoked the jurisdiction of the Court.  Mr Haughton disputed this saying “The jurisdiction is fraudulent and I found out after it was invoked by my lawyers”.”

Peter Haughton went on to raise allegations that the Crown has been removed without a referendum and the Australia Acts are invalid, insisting the South Australia Supreme Court send his case “to the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria, where the current 54 criminal defendants are sitting there now and concealed since 2004 all the way up to 2009 …by the Attorney-General, Robert Hulls.” At one point, he said that whilst his case was “for the loss of the lease” he could not give him “the money because if I accept money from you I will accept money from criminal jurisdiction”. 

“As far as it was possible to discern his position, it appeared that Mr Haughton wished to continue his action against Mr Chang and Ms Kiew in order to maintain his argument that the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear it.  This is not only logically inconsistent but also, arguably, an abuse of process.”

Mr Chang and Ms Kiew however, wished to pursue their counter-claim, seeking interest under the terms of the agreement, payment for landfill deposited on their property, damages for loss of expected income, rent and royalties for 13 years and 3 months due to Peter Haughton’s breach of the agreement, cost of remediation of their property, damage to a fence between their property and that occupied by Peter Haughton, and legal costs. McIntyre J awarded Mr Chang and Ms Kiew $364,988.00 inclusive of interest.

In Southdale Stud Pty Ltd v RJR Trading Pty Ltd [2020] SASC 106 (16 June 2020) Peter Haughton sought an extension of time to appeal from the initial order for possession of the property. In that initial case, the appellant challenged the validity of the Australia Act 1986 as it was passed without a referendum, and the consequence of this was that the court is not validly constituted. The court relied on Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545:

“The High Court has accepted the Australia Act as valid, and the defendant’s argument can go no further. It is difficult, in any event, to make a link between the argument about the validity of the Australia Act and the issues before the Court in this matter.”

The grounds of appeal challenged the reliance on Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet. and purported to raise the same issue as was initially raised, citing section 128 of the Constitution was breached. Bleby J responded:

“This argument is manifestly misconceived. Section 128 of the Constitution concerns the alteration of the Constitution itself. The appellant has not raised any argument of merit that is capable of challenging the validity of the Australia Act at all. Further, the existence of this Court is not dependent on the validity of the Australia Act. In any event, as the respondent submits, it is not for this Court to depart from what is manifestly ‘seriously considered dicta’ of the High Court as to the validity of the Australia Act, even if, against all probability, I had concluded that the Notice of Appeal contained a proposition of merit. (See Farah Constructions v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 (at 134, Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ.)

The following picture started circulating social media in mid June 2020, with the posters concluding that Livesey J had conceded that “the Australia Acts were finished” meaning it was invalid or in some way unconstitutional. Many rejoiced at this proposition, and it was shared widely.


Nothing could be further from the truth, the comments and responses are cherry-picked and taken out of context. After reading the transcript apparently supplied by Peter Haughton, it is clear that the discussion was regarding the particular matter being addressed. In any case, a number of different submissions are raised in the statement of claim, and addressed separately. The submission regarding the Australia Act was finished, not the Act itself. So in reality, Livesey J. merely admitted they had finished talking about it. Such is the nature of confirmation bias induced moralistic fallacies found on these social media platforms. It produced posts such as:

“The Australia Act has been recognised in court by a judge that it’s finished, void, unlawful, a treasonous document drafted by Bob Hawke to override our constitution. Taking power away from the Australian people and giving the corporate government the power to rule over us.”


Commonwealth Bank v Haughton (No.SCCIV-18-1361) was mainly concerned with Peter Haughton’s submissions, and the case was adjourned for the decision in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Haughton [2020] SASC 135 (17 July 2020).

“Speaking generally, Mr Haughton and his “group of friends” believe that there have, since 1945, been a series of legally significant events.  These include that Australia remains under the trusteeship of the United Nations, that the Honourable R J Hawke AC and others were ineligible to sit in the Commonwealth Parliament when significant decisions were taken during the 1980s and 1990s (including the “sale” of the bank), that the bank’s Memorandum and Articles of Association were not validly signed, that the Australia Acts of 1986 were passed without the necessary referenda and that all laws since passed (whether state or federal) are invalid, and that the Commonwealth of Australia is in fact a privately owned corporation based in the United States of America with the result that I and other judges are paid by a foreign power.”

Peter Haughton relied upon a passage in a dissenting judgment in the reasons of Kirby J in Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, to which Livesey J pointed out the majority found that it was sufficient that the Australia Act was passed in reliance upon section 51(xxxviii) of the Constitution which confers on the Commonwealth power to legislate at the request of the states, and that the High Court, including Kirby J, subsequently determined that the Australia Acts with the state requests and consent legislation were valid, in Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 218 CLR 28, and added that in Sue v Hill (1999) HCA 30 it was also regarded as valid. Livesey J held that he submitted nothing that would challenge the outcome in Marquet, nor the ruling later made in Shaw v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, that the continuance of the State Constitution pursuant to section 106 was subject to any Commonwealth law enacted pursuant to a grant of legislative power under section 51(xxxviii) of the Constitution, and that section 6 of the Australia Act 1986 was not an attempt to alter sections 106 or 107 other than in accordance with the procedures required by section 128. Further, Livesey J reminded him that:

“Even if this is merely regarded as seriously considered dicta of the High Court, it remains binding on me, Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2010) 230 CLR 89, [134] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ).”

Peter Haughton also contended that the Australia Act 1986 altered the Constitution because it introduced a Queen of Australia when in fact there was no Queen of Australia. Livesey J responded:

“It seems to me that the reasons that required earlier courts to reject this argument apply here. (See Haughton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2019] SASC 198, [25]-[33] (Kelly J), permission to appeal refused and Haughton v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2020] SASCFC 14.)”

Peter Haughton disputed the ruling in Sue v Hill that the UK is a foreign power, saying:

“…was because the Bill of Rights and the Act of Settlement 1700 bans Catholics. Bans them outright, get rid of them, get lost, get out of here. Now that didn’t get put into the case and that’s why the case went through but … really it’s a joke… the very large fraud out the front of the Catholic Church building just across the road there … you know the statue of Mary Mackillop … that’s actually Ethel Shaw. That’s a picture of somebody else. So they’re gaining a financial advantage by deception by putting a picture of somebody else in black and people are going donating money to it. It’s a huge fraud. … if you want to invoke the United Kingdom as a foreign power then that invalidates the warrant to build Masonic Lodges in Australia and the warrant to have anything to do with Masonic Lodges here in Australia because Masonic Lodges are a foreign power of the United Kingdom … and if you’re going to say that Sue v Hill is valid then all Freemasons and Freemasonry Lodges have to go. They’ve got to pack up and go because you can’t have both.”

Peter Haughton exhibited an affidavit by Brian Shaw making allegations against Julia Gillard, Rob Hulls, Damian Bugg and James McGinty, including allegations of criminal conduct and of treason. The argument then leapt to what he described as an Edgar search result, being a search of the US Securities and Exchange Commission, which apparently showed that there was a “Commonwealth of Australia” which was a private corporation with shareholders and that this, therefore, proved that the “Commonwealth of Australia” referred to in Commonwealth legislation is “owned by the private political parties called Commonwealth of Australia”. Peter Haughton contended that there had been no election to “turn us from a company of living people into a corporation with shareholders of the political parties” and then introduced the proposition that Bob Hawke should be disqualified under section 44(1) of the Constitution because he was granted honorary citizenship of Israel and was therefore a dual citizen, ineligible to sit in the Australian Parliament. How any of this could possibly be relevant to his case involving the Commonwealth Bank was never explained.

Eventually, Peter Haughton exhibited a promissory note in the amount of $310,000 that he says was given to the bank in November 2016, that was apparently stamped by the bank.  This, he said, means that the note was “executed … and accepted and granted by the Commonwealth Bank by an agent qualified to accept a bill of exchange, that means a teller”

“Mr Haughton concluded his address by telling me that he had planned to read out criminal charges because “there’s been a number of criminal offences … committed in this hearing” but “I think that you’ve been very kind to me … anybody who’s been trying to help or understand the situation doesn’t need that”.”

In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Haughton (No 2) [2020] SASC 187, Peter Haughton made an application for an order that Livesey J disqualify himself from hearing the trial in this action.  The basis for the application was that a family trust associated with the Judge held shares in the applicant Bank, a listed public company. The application was dismissed as there was no realistic possibility that the outcome of the case will affect the value of the shareholding.

In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Haughton (No 3) [2020] SASC 199, Peter Haughton attempted to pay the debt with another promissory note, which was also disregarded, and Livesey J held that the bank is entitled to judgment for the debt due in an amount of $483,542.82 and subsequently, possession of his investment property.  

Following this decision, in October 2021 Peter Haughton served a foisted unilateral contract affidavit on the courts with 39 numbered points, most of which had already been disposed of in his previous litigation. It came complete with his Fee Schedule:


A Registrar of the Court made an order that the Peter Haughton’s estate be sequestrated under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). Peter Haughton applied for a stay of the sequestration order until the hearing of an appeal against the primary decision. He did not comply with the timetable for filing further affidavits and did not attend the hearing in Chang v Haughton, in the matter of Haughton [2021] FCA 765 (2 July 2021), but in his affidavits he sought to reagitate the issues already disposed of in earlier decisions. White J dismissed the application. 

Peter Haughton filed another interlocutory application for a stay of the sequestration order until the hearing of an appeal against the primary decision, this time on the grounds he had not been served. In Chang v Haughton, in the matter of Haughton (No 2) [2021] FCA 998 (13 August 2021), White J heard evidence from the process server, including photographs of Peter Haughton at the time of service, and again dismissed the application.

Peter Haughton sought leave to appeal against the possession order made by the Auxiliary Master of the Supreme Court. In Haughton v Australia and New Zealand Banking Corporation [2021] SASCA 128 (28 October 2021) Livesey J and Bleby J observed initially that he sought to raise issues similar to those addressed in his previous litigation, and that the new appeal ignores the decisions of the Judge and the Full Court and seeks to reagitate the appeal against the order of the Auxiliary Master out of time, and is therefore liable to be struck out as incompetent. 

“On appeal, the applicant contended that he was not bound by the loan agreement because he did not complete it personally, although he did not suggest that he had not signed the loan application (the fraud claim). The applicant also contended that the respondent had breached the Code of Banking Practice by relying on a grossly overstated value for the mortgaged property, although he adduced no evidence before the Auxiliary Master to support this claim. Finally, the applicant advanced a number of “constitutional” arguments relating to the validity of Australian legislation following the enactment of the Royal Style and Titles Act 1973 (Cth), which he claimed was invalid. The Judge found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate any error in the Auxiliary Master’s reasons and dismissed the appeal. The applicant subsequently sought permission to appeal the Judge’s dismissal of his appeal to the Full Court of the Supreme Court. That application was dismissed by the Full Court after the Court found that it the application was “devoid of any merit”. The applicant now seeks to pursue a second appeal against the Auxiliary Master’s orders.”

The single ground for this appeal was a repeat of the fraud claim, and it was therefore dismissed. 

In earlier litigation, Peter Haughton had also submitted Glenn Bowley‘s satirical email from from David Prevett to the court, and remarked about it on pages 13-16 of the transcript of Peter and Sam Nominees Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. Peter Haughton likewise believed that the statement is fraudulent:

“I mean, now, this was stamped by the Commissioner of Police and my apologies, I’ve printed the wrong – I do have a stamped copy, my apologies, but I gave it to the Commissioner of Police and he’s done nothing with it. So we can’t trust the people who we run to for help because in this document here, if we go to the back of it, there’s a forensic examination – this is how bad the justices are in this country. I gave him a forensic examination document, the court, and they said it’s not fraud but it’s been done by a police officer. So the courts are telling the police officer that fraud is not fraud.”


In September 2021, Peter Haughton was arrested after a police raided on his community, and was refused bail due to fears he was becoming erratic and dangerous.

ABC: “Man in custody after police raid alternative community meeting over public safety concerns“:

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In a further hearing, bail was again refused. The Advertiser: “Peter Scott Haughton refused bail in Supreme Court“:

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Other OPCA adherents started a GoFundMe to “free” the alleged “Political Prisoner“: